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CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENTS & TAX
LIABILITY: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE
William H. Baker*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the provisions of the tax law have been of
extreme interest to most people. Politicians talk about the
tax law, particularly during their campaigns for office, and
Congress is constantly tinkering with the Internal Revenue
Code, periodically making significant changes to it. The
changes are made for many reasons. In some instances,
changes are made to affect the nation's economy. An increase
in taxes tends to limit inflation, while a decrease in taxes
tends to stimulate an economy with recessionary tendencies.
Changes in the law can be made to benefit particular sectors
of the business world, resulting in benefits that will accrue to
society at large. An example is legislation that grants tax
benefits to industries that install pollution control equipment:
not only do those industries benefit from a reduction in tax,
but the larger society benefits from reduced air pollution.1
There also is tax legislation designed to address the question
of fairness and equal treatment of taxpayers,2 or tax legisla-
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. J.D., University of
Maryland; A.B., Duke University.
1. In 1969, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 169, which provides an election to
amortize "certified pollution control facilities" over five years. I.R.C. § 169(a),
(b) (West 2001). The purpose of this legislation was to provide a financial incen-
tive to private industry by way of a rapid write-off for facilities whose function
is to abate or control air or water pollution. See S. REP. No. 91-552 (1969).
2. For example, I.R.C. § 1041, enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, pro-
vides that no gain or loss will result on the transfer of property between spouses
or former spouses (if the transfer is incident to a divorce), even though the prop-
erty may be subject to different state property laws. See I.R.C. § 1041. Prior to
§ 1041, the spouse making the transfer could recognize gain when property was
transferred in connection with a divorce because the relinquishment of marital
rights by the transferee spouse was held to constitute a consideration received
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tion that is directed at simplifying the complex tax system.
Congress and the President recently took a step in the right
direction when they put new legislation on the books that ad-
dresses many of these problems.3
The need for tax simplification can arise in unusual
situations. This article will discuss the issue of identifying
the proper taxpayer with respect to the fee earned in contin-
gency fee cases. If the fee is treated as belonging to the at-
torney immediately upon resolution of the case, the client will
not have to treat the amount of the fee as part of his or her
gross income. On the other hand, if the amount of the recov-
ery represented by the fee is treated as belonging to the client
when the suit is resolved, the client, after treating that
amount as gross income, will be able to claim only a miscella-
neous itemized deduction, assuming that the matter in litiga-
tion is a personal as opposed to a business matter. The mis-
cellaneous itemized deduction will not be as beneficial as
having the fee be treated as income of the attorney only. The
circuits are split on the issue of whether the attorney or the
client should be treated as initially receiving the amount of
the fee. This article will analyze this issue and the need for
tax simplification that it raises.
The need for tax simplification as indicated by the con-
tingency fee agreement issue discussed in this article is only a
by the transferor. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), which was
based on the law of Delaware, a common law state. No gain, however, would
have resulted in a community property state where a "division" of property
would have resulted under similar circumstances. Section 1041 therefore
brings about equal treatment for taxpayers in common law and community
property states.
3. The recent Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, was directed at a number of these goals. Some
examples of the way that the Act simplified the tax laws are repealing the es-
tate tax for decedents dying after December 31, 2009; repealing the generation
skipping tax provisions for generation skipping transfers made after December
31, 2009; repealing the limit on itemized deductions over a five-year period be-
ginning in 2006; and repealing of the personal exemption phase-out for years
beginning after 2009. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act,
§ 501(a), 115 Stat. at 69 (amending 26 U.S.C. by adding § 2210) (estate tax re-
peal); § 501(b), 115 Stat. at 69 (adding § 2664) (generation-skipping transfer tax
repeal); § 103, 115 Stat. at 44-45 (adding § 68(f)-(g)) (limitation on itemized de-
ductions phase-out); § 102, 115 Stat. at 44 (adding § 151(d)(3)(F)) (personal ex-
emption phase-out ("PEP") repeal). Note, however, that the Act presently con-
tains a sunset provision under which all provisions and amendments made by
the Act shall not apply to years after December 31, 2010. See Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, § 901(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 150.
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part of the broader need for simplification. The issue of sim-
plifying the tax code has long been a subject of discussion.
Many government bodies, associations, politicians and impor-
tant individuals in industry and the academic world have
spoken out in favor of tax simplification. On April 26, 2001,
Richard M. Lipton, on behalf of the American Bar Association
("ABA") Section of Taxation,4 made a statement before the
Committee on Finance of the United States Senate in which
he made specific recommendations relating to tax simplifica-
tion.' In his statement, Mr. Lipton noted that the ABA and
the Section of Taxation have long been strong advocates of
tax simplification, and in 1976 and 1985, the ABA passed
proposals of the Section of Taxation urging tax simplification.6
The statement illustrates how the Internal Revenue Code
("Code") and Regulations have become more complex in recent
years, as Congress and different administrations have sought
to address various tax-related issues and raise revenue with-
out actually raising tax rates.7 Mr. Lipton makes numerous
recommendations, several of which might be noted.8 The
Joint Committee on Taxation recently released the 1,300-
page report, representing a year and a half of study.9 The
4. The Section of Taxation is composed of 20,000 tax lawyers, which makes
it the largest and broadest based professional organization of tax lawyers in the
country.
5. See Tax Code Complexity: New Hope for Fresh Solutions, Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Fin., 107th Cong. 39 (2001) (statement of Richard M. Lipton,
Chair, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.),
available at 2001 WL 2007279 [hereinafter Fresh Solutions].
6. See id. at 40. Some of Mr. Lipton's recommendations, as Chair of the
Section of Taxation of the ABA, are set forth infra note 8.
7. Mr. Lipton states, "In recent years, the Code has become more and more
complex as Congress and various administrations have sought to address diffi-
cult issues, target various tax incentives and raise revenue without explicit rate
increases." Fresh Solutions, supra note 5.
8. Included among Mr. Lipton's recommendations are the repeal of the in-
dividual and corporate versions of the alternative minimum tax, I.R.C. §§ 55-59
(West 2001); repeal of the itemized deduction phase-out or Pease limitation,
I.R.C. § 68; repeal of PEP, I.R.C. § 151(d)(3); simplifying the capital gains provi-
sions; and clarifying the distinction between capitalizing and deducting costs.
See id. at 41-47. The individual alternative minimum tax was enacted in 1969
"to address concerns that people with significant economic income were paying
little or no Federal taxes because of investments in tax shelters." Id. at 41. As
previously noted, supra note 3, beginning in 2006, the Pease limitation and PEP
are being repealed by the Economic Growth & Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, although the sunset provision makes the repeals inapplicable to years af-
ter 2010.
9. 1-3 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY ON
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study focused on tax simplification and suggested revamping
the Code. The study details the causes of the complexity of
the Code and makes a number of recommendations, including
the elimination of the alternative minimum tax and the two-
percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions."°
Others have spoken out on this problem. On May 25,
1999, Harry L. Gutman, a partner in Klywerd, Peat, Mar-
wick, Goerdeler ("KPMG"), 1' of Washington, D.C., testified as
to his own views on tax complexity and simplification before
the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on
Ways and Means." In his testimony, Mr. Gutman described
the sources of much of the complexity in the tax law." He
pointed out how complexity in the law often comes about
when Congress, for political reasons, "disguises the substance
of its legislative changes." 4 He stated, "The personal exemp-
tion and itemized deduction phase-outs--commonly known as
'PEP and Pease'-are prime examples. Rather than provid-
ing explicitly for a marginal rate increase when these provi-
sions were added in 1990, Congress hid the real nature of
THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986 (Comm. Print 2001). The Joint Committee on Taxation is a
committee made up of five members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate
and five members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Repre-
sentatives. See I.R.C. §§ 8001-23; Mark A. Luscombe, Tax Trends, 79 TAXES 3
(2001).
10. When Congress enacted the alternative minimum tax as part of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487, 580, the purpose of
the tax was to insure a reasonable amount of fairness between the tax liabilities
of high income taxpayers and lower income taxpayers. The tax was directed at
high income taxpayers who could benefit from certain tax incentives and prefer-
ences that could reduce or eliminate their regular income tax liability. These
benefits were not available to lower income taxpayers.
The two-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions limits certain
itemized deductions, including legal fees, to those deductions exceeding two-
percent of adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 67. Accordingly, taxpayers who
are limited to taking such deductions do not receive a full offset against income
from them. See id. In addition, these deductions are not permitted in comput-
ing the alternative minimum tax. See id. § 56(b)(1).
11. KPMG is one of the Big 5 accounting firms.
12. Impact of Complexity in the Tax Code on Individual Taxpayers and
Small Businesses: Hearing on H.R. 1407 and H.R. 1420 Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 70-75 (1999)
(statement of Harry L. Gutman, Partner, KPMG LLP), available at 1999 WL
16948410.
13. Id. at 73.
14. Id.
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these provisions as rate increases by calling them 'phase-
outs.""' 5 It is interesting to note that in his statement, Mr.
Gutman also recommended the repeal of the alternative
minimum tax.6
Through the years, many people have expressed similar
views. In 1985, former President Gerald R. Ford stated, "I
strongly favor the concept and objectives of President
Reagan's tax simplification program.... The goal of fairness
and simplicity is very, very important .... I hope that we
end up with a simpler and more equitable federal tax sys-
tem."7 There clearly have been many pleas for greater fair-
ness and simplicity in the tax laws, and the discussion that
follows relates to these concepts in a particular setting.
II. RECENT CASES DEMONSTRATE NEED FOR TAX
SIMPLIFICATION
A number of recent decisions have demonstrated how cer-
tain provisions of the tax law can bring about unfair and in-
equitable treatment of taxpayers. These cases involve the
question of identifying the proper taxpayer in situations
where a client and an attorney have entered into a contin-
gency fee agreement. 8
The circuits are split on the question of whether a contin-
gency fee agreement will result in the portion of the recovery
representing legal fees being treated as income to the client.
The Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the fee
portion of the recovery is not income to the client (taxpayer).9
The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and Federal Circuits have
15. Id.
16. Id. at 74-75.
17. Evan Roth, Ford Endorses 'Objectives' of Tax Change, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, May 30, 1985.
18. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000); Estate of Clarks
v. United States, 2000 FED App. 0020P (6th Cir.), 202 F.3d 854; Young v.
Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.
2000); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000); Foster v.
United States, 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001); Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346
(11th Cir. 2000); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995); O'Brien
v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707 (1962), affd 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963); Kenseth v.
Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399 (2000), affd 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
19. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959); Srivastava v.
Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 2000
FED App. 98-2437 (6th Cir.), 202 F.3d 854; Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346
(11th Cir. 2000); Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001).
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ruled that the attorney's fee is treated as income to the client
(taxpayer)."0 In any event, the fee will be taxable as' income to
the attorney who earns the fee and ultimately receives it.
One of these recent cases involves a taxpayer who re-
tained an attorney on a contingent fee basis to bring suit
against a radio station and its parent company for defama-
tion."' The jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff-taxpayer (client)
and the parties worked out a settlement, which was paid to
the plaintiff in 1991. The taxpayer, however, did not report
any income from the settlement." The Commissioner deter-
mined that the part of the settlement representing interest
and punitive damages was taxable income and asserted a de-
ficiency on that basis.2 The taxpayer contested the deficiency
and filed suit, claiming that the amount payable to the attor-
ney because of the contingency fee agreement was not includ-
able in his gross income. The Tax Court rejected the tax-
payer's position, holding that the entire amount of the
settlement, including the portion owed as attorneys' fees, was
in fact income to the taxpayer and thus upheld the Commis-
sioner's ruling on the tax deficiency. 4 Accordingly, the case
squarely raised the question of identifying the proper tax-
payer.
Did the income earned by the attorney under the contin-
gent fee agreement constitute income belonging to him from
the instant it was available under the settlement? Or should
it be viewed as having first been paid to the plaintiff, who
then paid the fee to the attorney? It does not make a differ-
ence to the attorney because the fee will be income to him in
any event. But it does make a difference to the plaintiff (cli-
ent). If the amount of the fee is treated as part of his gross
income in the first instance, he will be entitled to a deduction
for the fee paid to the attorney under the contingency fee
agreement. The deduction in most instances, however, will be
a miscellaneous itemized deduction, which will only be de-
ductible to the extent that it exceeds two percent of the tax-
20. See O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1963); Young v. Comm'r,
240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Kenseth v.Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001);
Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Baylin v. United States, 43
F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
21. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
22. See id. at 356.
23. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 104(a) (West 2001).
24. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 638, 646 (1998).
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payer's adjusted gross income.25 Presently, there is also an
overall limitation on itemized deductions, 26 but the limitation,
as previously indicated, is being repealed for years after
2009.7
It also is detrimental to the taxpayer to include the at-
torney's fee as part of the taxpayer's gross income in cases of
this kind because miscellaneous itemized deductions are not
allowed to individuals for the purpose of computing the alter-
native minimum tax.2'8  A taxpayer would be able to avoid
these obstacles if the fees were treated as belonging to the at-
torney in the first instance and never having become part of
the gross income of the taxpayer (client).29  In cases like
Srivastava v. Commissioner, the limitations on the deduction
would never go into effect. In fact, Srivastava held that the
income in the amount of the legal fee was solely the attorney's
income and not that of the client.3 °
III. THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE
At the heart of these cases is the question of whether a
contingency fee agreement amounts to an anticipatory as-
signment of income from the client to the attorney. Ordinar-
ily, income is taxable to the one who receives it or has a legal
right to receive it.3" But one who has a right to receive income
cannot simply designate an alternate recipient and thereby
make that person liable for the tax on the income. 2 The Su-
preme Court established the assignment of income doctrine in
the landmark case of Lucas v. Earl.3 The Internal Revenue
Code does not contain a provision relating to the assignment
of income.
25. See I.R.C. § 67(a).
26. See I.R.C. § 68. Adjusted gross income is defined as meaning gross in-
come minus business deductions and a number of other specifically enumerated
deductions. See I.R.C. § 62.
27. Total repeal will take place for years after 2009, but the repeal will be
effected on a gradual basis beginning in 2006. See Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 103, 115 Stat. 38, 44
(codified at I.R.C. § 68(f)-(g)).
28. See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
29. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000); Estate of Clarks
v. United States, 2000 FED App. 0020P (6th Cir.), 202 F.3d 854.
30. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 365.
31. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940).
32. See id.
33. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
763
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Lucas v. Earl involved an attempt to assign income
earned by an attorney as salary and legal fees.34 In 1901, an
attorney and his wife entered into an agreement providing in
substance that any property that either of them owned or
would acquire in the future, including future earnings, would
belong to both parties as joint tenants." The husband earned
the salary and fees in question in 1920 and 1921, and the
husband took the position that this income properly was at-
tributable one-half to himself and one-half to his wife pursu-
ant to the agreement between them." If, at the instant that
the salaries and fees were received, one-half belonged to each
party, the position of the husband would have been correct.
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that salaries were
taxable to the person who earned them, and held that tax li-
ability cannot be "escaped by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary
when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who
earned it." 7 The Court used the metaphor of fruit growing on
a tree and indicated that the fruits (income) cannot be attrib-
uted to a "different tree from that on which they grew." 8 In
the case of income earned through personal services, once a
taxpayer has earned the income, it is not possible to assign it
to another to avoid tax liability with respect to the income,
while making the assignee responsible for reporting and pay-
ing the tax." In Lucas, the attempted assignment was made
years before the taxpayer earned the income in question, yet
it still was not effective in making the taxpayer's wife liable
as a taxpayer on one-half of it."0 The reason for that result
was that in his attempt to make his wife the taxpayer as to
one-half of his income, the taxpayer, who had earned the in-
come, had exercised control over the enjoyment of the income
by the act of disposing of it.4
34. See id. at 113.
35. See id. at 113-14.
36. See id. at 114.
37. Id. at 115.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 114-15.
40. See id. at 113-14.
41. The definition of income is "all income from whatever source derived."
I.R.C. § 61 (West 2001). Section 61 elaborates on that definition by listing fif-
teen examples to demonstrate various types of economic gain that can consti-
tute income. See id. But Helvering v. Horst teaches that there must be a reali-
zation of income as the taxable event. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115
[Vol. 42
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A. Applicability of the Assignment of Income Doctrine
This doctrine applies in two situations. The first relates
to income earned through personal services." As discussed
above, a taxpayer cannot assign income that he plans to earn
or has already earned through personal services to another
person, thereby making the assignee the taxpayer with re-
spect to that income and avoiding paying tax on it himself.4"
Even though the taxpayer may never actually receive the in-
come, the taxpayer has controlled the beneficial enjoyment of
the income by directing payment to the assignee." The sec-
ond situation relates to income produced by property owned
by the taxpayer." In the case of property, one can make an-
other the taxpayer as to income produced by the property if a
transfer of ownership is made of all or the portion of the prop-
erty producing the income.46 To put it in terms of the analogy
that is customarily used, if part of the "tree" is transferred,
the income subsequently produced by that part of the tree
will belong to and be taxable to the transferee.47
(1940). It is not, however, necessary for the taxpayer to actually receive cash or
property for there to be a "realization." Id. Realization takes place "when the
last step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of the economic gain which
has already occurred to him." Id. The opinion goes on to point out, "[t]he power
to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that
power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment, and hence
the realization, of the income by him who exercises it." Id. at 118.
42. Lucas is the original case establishing the concept that income earned
by a particular person is taxable to that person. See Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114.
That clearly is the rule, except in community property states where income
earned by either spouse belongs one-half to the other spouse. See Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). However, a different rule may apply in commu-
nity property states where the spouses live apart. See I.R.C. §§ 66(a), 879(a).
43. See Lucas, 281 U.S. at 111; Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.
2000).
44. In the Horst case the Supreme Court noted,
Income is "realized" by the assignor because he, who owns or controls
the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he
could have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to
others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants. The
taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and
obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the
income to procure those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his
right to collect it as the means of procuring them.
Horst, 311 U.S. at 116-17.
45. See id. at 113; Salvatore v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 89 (1970).
46. See Comm'r v. O'Donnell, 90 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd on. other
grounds, 303 U.S. 370 (1938); Blair v. United States, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
47. See Lucas, 281 U.S. at 115; see also Horst, 311 U.S. at 120 (using the
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One of the leading cases involving income-producing
property is Helvering v. Horst.4" In Horst, the taxpayer, who
owned bonds with interest coupons attached, transferred the
interest coupons to his son and claimed that the income was
taxable to the son when the son redeemed the coupons.45 In
order to make the interest income taxable to the son, how-
ever, an interest in the bonds themselves would have had to
be transferred." The Supreme Court held that the income
was still taxable to the father because he owned the tree on
which the fruit was produced, and he could not simply trans-
fer the fruit and make the transferee the taxpayer as to that
amount of the income." The assignment of income concept
set forth in Horst has been followed in many subsequent
cases.5 It should be noted that in Horst, nothing further re-
mained to be done in the way of personal services to produce
the interest income on the bonds.5 Even though no further
action was required, it was a certainty that the interest in-
come would be paid.5 4 It is understandable that under those
circumstances, the father's attempt merely to assign the in-
come, produced solely from property that he continued to
own, was ineffective.55
B. Exceptions to the Assignment of Income Doctrine
There may be unusual cases where a taxpayer can avoid
being treated as the taxpayer if the "assignment" took place
before the income was earned and the taxpayer did not con-
trol its disposition. Along these lines, the case of Commis-
tree analogy); Blair, 300 U.S. at 5 (following the principal used in Lucas).
48. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
49. See id. at 114.
50. See id. at 119.
51. See id. at 118-19.
52. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Comm'r v. Harmon,
323 U.S. 44 (1944); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001).
53. In Horst, the Court referred to the reasoning of the lower court, which
believed that because consideration for the interest coupons on the bonds had
been transferred to the obligor, the donor had by the gift parted with all control
over them and their payment. Accordingly, the case was distinguished from
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), and Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136
(1932), where the assignment of compensation for services had taken place be-
fore the services were rendered, and where the income was held taxable to the
donor. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 114-15.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 120.
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sioner v. Giannini6 is instructive but somewhat unique. In
Giannini, the taxpayer had worked for a corporation fbr the
first half of the year and had been compensated for his ser-
vices." At that point, he instructed the company that he
would not accept any further compensation for the year and
suggested that the corporation "do something worthwhile"
with the remainder of his salary."6 The corporation donated
the money to a university.59 The court held that Giannini was
not taxable on the income for his services for the second half
of the year."0 The court noted that the taxpayer had not bene-
ficially received the income because he neither received the
income nor controlled its disposition.6' Accordingly, in that
case, there was never an attempt to assign income to which
the taxpayer had a right. His notice to the company of his in-
tention not to receive any income for the second half of the
year had the effect of preventing him from ever having a right
to receive the income.62 He could not assign income that he
never had a right to receive and over which he had no con-
trol. 3 His permitting the employer to dispose of the funds
according to its wishes established his complete rejection of
any control over its disposition."
In the same year as the Lucas v. Earl decision, the Su-
preme Court decided another case, which did allow for income
to be divided between taxpayers on the basis of state law pro-
visions." Poe v. Seaborn involved the community property
law of the State of Washington.6 Under the Washington
statute, income of either spouse was treated as instantly be-
56. 129 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1942).
57. See id. at 639.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 641.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 640.
64. As shown by Horst and explained in Giannini, if a taxpayer does not ac-
tually receive income to which he has a right, he will still be taxable on it if he
controls its disposition by directing the benefit of it to another. See Horst, 311
U.S. at 115; Giannini, 129 F.2d at 641. But where one receives no cash or prop-
erty and gives up the right to receive it or to control its disposition by naming
someone else to benefit from it prior to its becoming effective, Giannini holds
that no income results to the taxpayer. See Giannini, 129 F.2d at 641.
65. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
66. See id. at 110-11 (explaining that a spouse's ownership interest is dic-
tated by the statutes of the State and the decisions interpreting them).
767
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longing to each from the moment it was earned.67 Therefore,
spouses were able to spread their income equally and have it
taxed at lower rates overall than if the one spouse who earned
the income was taxed on all of it.68 That case provided a sig-
nificant advantage to couples living in community property
states. In 1948, joint income tax returns came into the law
and permitted married couples to be taxed at a tax rate simi-
lar to that applicable to couples in community property
states.69
The assignment of income doctrine also has been held not
to apply where the claim or rights of the taxpayer were uncer-
tain and there existed doubt as to collectibility° A transfer
by a taxpayer of his rights in a claim that is doubtful, uncer-
tain and contingent becomes taxable to the assignee when col-
lection of the claim occurs, but not to the taxpayer.7 Where a
claim is being litigated, if the taxpayer makes a transfer of
the claim before the appeals have been exhausted, the income
67. See id. at 111.
68. See id. at 118. Because of the graduated rate structure, splitting income
between two spouses was more beneficial than having all the income taxed to
one spouse at a higher graduated rate. For example, if a couple had $100,000 of
taxable income, and if all of it were taxable to the husband at a top marginal
rate of forty percent, the total tax paid would be $40,000. But if the income
were treated as belonging one-half to each spouse, and the highest marginal
rate were eighteen percent on $50,000 for an individual, the total tax which
would be paid by both spouses would be $36,000, or $4,000 less than if all of the
income were attributable to the husband alone.
69. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 303, 62 Stat. 110, 115.
70. See Dodge v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 535 (D. Or. 1977).
71. See Jones v. Comm'r, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962). In Jones, the tax-
payer was a subcontractor on a construction project for the U.S. Government.
Jones sustained a loss of over $350,000 in 1943 and 1944. See id. In 1944 and
1945, he sold and leased his equipment and paid part of a large debt owed to the
surety on his bond. See id. In 1944, the prime contractor submitted a claim to
the Government for $1,235,833.65 additional compensation due on the job. See
id. at 294. Part of this claim related to services performed by Jones. Jones was
not able to recover directly from the Government but was relegated to recovery
through the prime contractor. See id. In 1952, Jones ended his business as an
individual, and in 1953, he assigned all of his right, title or interest in the claim
against the Government to a corporation, Drilling, which agreed to pay Jones
$10,000 and all of Jones's income tax liability for 1948, 1949 and 1950, plus ex-
penses incurred in the defense of such liability. See id. The claim against the
Government was denied, and suit was filed by the prime contractor in the U.S.
Court of Claims. See id. In 1953, the prime contractor won a substantial part
of its claim, and the part of the recovery belonging to Jones was paid to him and
immediately endorsed over to Drilling. The court concluded that the proceeds of
the judgment attributable to Jones were not taxable to him but were taxable to
Drilling, by virtue of the assignment. See id. at 301.
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ultimately paid to the transferee is not taxable to the tax-72
payer. These cases generally involve situations where the
claim was uncertain and contingent at the time the assign-
ment was made, and the assignment was not a gift but made
for a business purpose.73 Where the assignment was made as
a gift, after all appeals had been exhausted in the pending
litigation over the claim, the amount of the claim was deemed
to be sufficiently certain so that income did result to the tax-
payer-assignor.74
Although these cases did not involve contingency fee
agreements, they did focus on the interests that the assignors
had at the time the assignments were made, which is an im-
portant factor in contingency fee cases.75 It should be noted,
however, that the question of taxability in a contingency fee
agreement case involves different considerations from those
involved in the ordinary assignment case. An assignment
that is made prior to the conclusion of litigation at a time
when the claim is uncertain can result in gross income to the
assignee only. But if there is a contingent fee agreement in
the same matter, it is possible, based on the facts of the par-
ticular case, that at the conclusion of the litigation, the as-
signor (client) will be treated as receiving gross income with
respect to the amount of the recovery representing the attor-
ney's fee.
Another type of assignment of income that has received
considerable attention from the general public involves lot-
tery ticket winnings. 6 Generally, if part of the ticket is as-
signed to someone before the ticket has become a winner, the
72. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Comm'r, 247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 200107019 (Feb. 16, 2001).
73. See Jones v. Comm'r, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962), and cases cited
therein.
74. See Doyle v. Comm'r, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945).
75. Foster v. United States, a recent case which involved a contingency fee
agreement, held that no income resulted to the assignor-client, even though the
agreement was entered into after a jury verdict and while an appeal was pend-
ing. Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001). Foster was
based on Alabama law and followed Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.
1959), and Estate of Clarks v. United States, 2000 FED App. 0020P (6th Cir.),
202 F.3d 854. See Foster, 249 F.3d at 1277.
76. To help resolve the question of who pays the tax on lottery winnings, the
Service has issued Form 5754, which is prepared by the winner but lists other
parties who are entitled to share in the winnings. See Sharing the Winnings,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1995, at 80.
769
770 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
assignment will be effective to transfer part of the winnings
to the assignee." Assuming that the person who purchased
the ticket makes a valid gift or transfer of it to someone else,
that person will become taxable only on his share of the win-
nings."8 This would be a means of shifting income to another
taxpayer. But once the ticket has been identified as a winner,
it is then too late to assign away any part of it. 9 The ticket
will then be treated as a property interest of the original
owner, and the income will be attributed to him much the
same as the interest income in Helvering v. Horst was treated
as belonging to the bondholder."0
But note the case of Kochansky v. Commissioner, in
which an attorney filed a lawsuit for a client under a contin-
gency fee arrangement.8' Before the suit was settled, the at-
torney and his wife divorced. The divorce agreement pro-
vided that the taxpayer and his wife would split the
contingent fee that would be paid in connection with the law-
suit."2 A portion of the fee was paid to each individual, and
each paid tax on the part that he or she received.83 The Gov-
ernment determined that the entire fee was the tax liability
of the attorney, and the court agreed because the attorney
alone had earned the income in question.84 That was purely a
case of an attempt to assign income earned through personal
services, and despite the fact that the amount to be earned
was uncertain and contingent at the time of the divorce
77. A woman who won the sweepstakes was successful in shifting the tax
liability on part of the winnings. The Tax Court held that she had intended to
make a gift to her husband and two children of part of her sweepstakes ticket at
the time she bought it, using a nom de plume. See Chelius v. Comm'r, 17
T.C.M. (CCH) 121 (1958).
78. In Chelius, the Tax Court held that a valid gift had been made even
though the transfer of a part interest in the sweepstakes ticket to the assignees
was not put in writing until after the lottery took place and the ticket was
drawn. See Chelius v. Comm'r, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 121 (1958). See also Droge v.
Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937); Huntington v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 835 (1937).
79. In Braunstein v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that where a sweep-
stakes ticket was assigned after the drawing but before the race, the assignor
was taxable on the amount guaranteed by the designation of a horse in the
drawing. Braunstein v. Comm'r, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1132 (1962). The assignment
of the amount subsequently won in the race was held to be valid-the winnings
were income to the assignees in the percentage assigned. See id.
80. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
81. See Kochansky v. Comm'r, 92 F.3d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1996).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 959.
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agreement, the attorney produced the income and was in con-
trol of his own services. The fact that the fee was contingent
on the outcome of the litigation was not significant because
the fee was attributable to the personal services rendered by
the attorney." The case was one step removed from address-
ing the issue of the tax liability of a client with respect to the
contingency fee earned by the attorney; it only involved the
attempted assignment of income clearly attributable to the
86
attorney.
Additionally, there are business contexts in which the as-
signment of income doctrine will not be applicable. If an as-
signment is made to another in return for a valuable consid-
eration in a valid business transaction, the doctrine has been
held not to apply. An example is Estate of Stranahan v.
Commissioner.7 In Stranahan, the taxpayer transferred to
another the right to receive a future dividend payment from a
corporation, and at the time of the transfer, the taxpayer re-
ceived a cash payment from the transferee in consideration
for the transfer.8 Although the assignment of income doc-
trine did not apply in that case, it can be distinguished from
the contingency fee agreement cases where the client does not
receive actual cash or other property at the time of the
agreement. In Stranahan, the purpose of the arrangement
was not to avoid taxation on the dividend income, but to re-
duce the tax liability of the taxpayer by permitting him to off-
set the payment received for the future dividend against an
interest deduction.89 Because that case involved valuable
consideration, the Stranahan court distinguished the case
from cases like Horst, which involved gratuitous transfers.90
Stranahan shows that the purpose of the arrangement is im-
portant, and the purpose in that case was not to shift income
to a lower bracket taxpayer, but to provide the taxpayer with
some income in the year of the agreement that could offset a
85. See id.
86. In the cases on which this article is based, the issue focuses on the
rights to the income produced under a contingency fee arrangement between a
client and an attorney. In Kochansky, the focus was not on that relationship
but on the taxability as between an attorney and his former spouse (not the cli-
ent with whom he had a contingent fee agreement). See id. at 957.
87. 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
88. See id. at 868.
89. See id. at 869.
90. See id. at 870.
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deduction that otherwise would not be useful.9
In order to gain a clear perspective of the nature of con-
tingency fee agreements, how they developed and what they
were intended to accomplish, this article will next examine
the history of such agreements.
IV. THE ORIGINS OF CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENTS
Contingency fee agreements were not always looked upon
with favor. In the Middle Ages in England, if a stranger of-
fered to prosecute a legal claim held by another for compensa-
tion, he could be subject to criminal penalties and the com-
mon law doctrine of champerty.92 The doctrine of champerty
involves the situation where a stranger enters into a bargain
with a party to a lawsuit, whereby the stranger offers to
prosecute the case at his own risk and expense in return for
receiving a portion of any amount recovered.93 In the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, high courts in England fol-
lowed the tradition of holding champertous contingency fee
agreements to be unlawful.9"
Contingency fee agreements, however, "may have been
common in late colonial America."" As early as 1813, Justice
Hugh Henry Brackenridge of Pennsylvania claimed that the
practice of entering into contingency fee agreements was cus-
tomary, even though the most prominent members of the bar
still took the position that such agreements were unlawful.9
In fact, "most of the earliest reported antebellum American
decisions on the subject held contingency fee arrangements to
be champertous and void."' 7 Between 1824 and 1840, several
states approved of these agreements," and by 1875, a number
91. See id.
92. See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The
Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 231 (1998).
93. See id. at 232; BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 292 (4th ed. 1968).
94. See Karsten, supra note 92, at 233.
95. Id. at 234.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 234-35.
98. By case law, New York approved of these agreements in 1824, Louisiana
in 1834 and Tennessee in 1836. See id. at 239 n.64. The next decade found the
courts of Arkansas, California, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Texas, Virginia and Wis-
consin following the same road. See id. at 239 n.65. In 1852, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court approved of these agreements. See id. at 239. After the Civil
War, Connecticut, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey and Utah approved of these
772 [Vol. 42
2002] TAXATION OF CONTINGENCY FEES 773
of additional states held contingency fee agreements to be en-
forceable.99 At an early point, some states by statute permit-
ted the use of these agreements. The Virginia legislature fol-
lowed that procedure in 1839, and New York enacted a
statute approving of these agreements in 1848.10 Many states
did not enact statutes but accomplished the same result
through their supreme courts.' Such agreements achieved
acceptance because people believed that an attorney would
prosecute a case with more energy when motivated by the
knowledge that he would share in the winnings.'2 But it is
more likely that these agreements became accepted because
they enabled indigent plaintiffs to assert their rights in
court."3 The popularity of these agreements can be attributed
to the fact that they provide a means of financing the costs of
prosecuting a claim while shifting the risk of not recovering
the costs from the client to the attorney.10
V. INTERESTS CREATED BY A CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT
As discussed above, there is a split among the circuits as
to the tax implications of contingency fee agreements. 5 At
the heart of the controversy is the type of interests created by
these agreements. Prior to entering into the agreement, does
the client have something that can be transferred to the at-
torney? At that point, the client has a cause of action against
the party who will become the defendant. The cause of action
is an incorporeal or intangible right.0 6 It is a chose in action,
which constitutes personal property.0 7 Accordingly, because a
cause of action is a form of property, it is capable of being
transferred from one party to another.
agreements through their case law. See id. at 239 n.66.
99. See id. at 239.
100. See id. at 240 n.74 & n.77 (citing 1839-1840 Va. Acts ch. 50 and 1848
N.Y. Laws ch. 379, respectively).
101. See id. at 239-40.
102. See id. at 241.
103. See Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law... What Might Happen if
Contingent Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 322 (1998).
104. See id.
105. See discussion supra Part II.
106. See Heyse v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 229 So. 2d 724 (La. 1969).
107. See Moore v. Nassau County Dep't of Pub. Transp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 652
(1974); Connelly v. Special Rd. & Bridge Dist., 99 Fla. 456 (1930); Mueller v.
Rupp, 761 P.2d 62 (1988); Sentry Ins. v Sky Mgmt., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 900
(D.N.J. 1999); see also 73 C.J.S. Property § 22 (1985).
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A. The Estate Tax Definition of Property
It is interesting to consider the effect of contingency fee
agreements in an estate tax context to see if cases in that
area will help to resolve the income tax question. For federal
estate tax purposes, the contingent nature of claims does not
prevent them from being included in the gross estate of the
deceased. °8 The term "property" as used in the federal estate
tax statute "embraces all choses in action, including claims
for compensation for services performed." °9
In Estate of Aldrich, a case involving an attorney acting
under a contingency fee agreement, the Tax Court declared
that the fees were to be included in his estate, despite the fact
that the attorney had not received the fees during his life-
time, and that there was no specific value attributable to
them at the time of his death.110 The Tax Court in Aldrich
held that the right of an attorney to fees under a contingency
fee agreement was includable in his estate even though he
died prior to the disposition of the case. In addition, the Al-
drich court indicated that the speculative nature of the claim
did not affect the inclusion of the fees in his estate, but only
affected the value of the claim."' Although cases of this kind
confirm the fact that contingent claims are property, they do
not answer the question of whether the amount of the fee
should be included in the client's gross income. The contin-
gent fee would be includable in the estate of the deceased at-
torney whether the fee were treated as payable directly out of
the recovery to the attorney, or payable out of the recovery af-
ter it had first been paid to the client.
Looking at the question of property rights for estate tax
purposes from the client's point of view, the contingent claim
is includable in the client's estate if the client dies before the
recovery results."' The case of Estate of Houston v. Commis-
sioner". is instructive on this point. In that case, the dece-
dent's estate included the value of claims for damages arising
108. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Contingencies and the Estate Tax, 5 FLA. TAX
REv. 49 (2001).
109. Estate of McGlue v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 1199 (1940); see also Rev. Rul.
55-123, 1955-1 C.B. 443; Estate of Curry v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 540 (1980); Estate
of Aldrich v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (1983).
110. See Estate of Aldrich, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1295.
111. See id.; see also Estate of Curry, 74 T.C. at 540.
112. See Estate of Lennon v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 326 (1991).
113. 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 284 (1982).
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out of the wrongful death of her deceased husband. The court
there stated,
[The] Estate Tax Reg[ulations] provide that the gross es-
tate shall include the date of death value of all property,
whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, benefi-
cially owned by the decedent. This includes the date of
death values of all existing claims and choses in action of
the decedent that pass to her estate notwithstanding that
they may be contingent and or uncertain as to amount.1
4
The court indicated that under case law in Michigan, a right
of action constitutes a property right."' Regarding the con-
tingent nature of the claim of the deceased widow, the court
stated, "The fact that the decedent's interest in the wrongful
death action was contingent upon future recovery by John's
estate, and the court's distribution of some or all thereof to
her, does not preclude inclusion of it in her gross estate or re-
quire that the value be set at zero.""6 The deceased's right of
action accrued on the date of her husband's death and contin-
ued to her own death and thereafter."7 The case, however,
did not involve a contingency fee agreement, which leaves
unanswered the question of whether the client should include
the amount of the recovery representing the fee in his or her
gross income.
A case that did involve a contingency fee agreement and
a deceased client's estate, however, is Estate of Lennon v.
Commissioner."8 In that case, the decedent had become ill
while working on a cruise ship of a shipping company. She
became comatose, and her guardian entered into a contingent
fee agreement with a law firm for the filing of a claim and
lawsuit. On April 8, 1985, a jury awarded Ms. Lennon
$7,750,000. The findings of fact indicated that "[a]fter the at-
torneys' contingent fees and costs were paid, decedent would
have been entitled to $3,706,131 of the $7,750,000 total
judgment.""9  The defendant filed an appeal. Ms. Lennon
114. Id. at 286 (discussing I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2033 (1954)).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 287.
117. Houston involved section 600.2922 of the Michigan Compiled Laws of
1972, a wrongful death statute that provided that the amounts recovered are to
be distributed in accordance with specific provisions in the statute. See Estate
of Houston, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) at 288.
118. 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 326 (1991).
119. Id.
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died on August 18, 1985, while the appeal was pending."'
The estate settled the case for $5,250,000 and the appeal
was dismissed. The facts indicate that after the law firm was
paid its fee (fifty percent of $5,250,000), and after other costs
were paid, the estate received a "new payment" under the set-
tlement of $2,456,131.121 The estate tax return included the
sum of $1,312,500 as decedent's interest in the judgment, af-
ter reduction for attorneys' fees had been effected. Subse-
quently, the Tax Court concluded that the date of death fair
market value of the decedent's interest in the judgment was
$1,750,000, after reduction for attorneys' fees and costs.
It appears that the attorneys' fees were not included in
the gross estate under sections 2031 and 2033 of the Code.
Even if the fees had been included in the gross estate, the es-
tate would have been entitled to a deduction for the fees un-
der section 2053 of the Code.
Accordingly, the Lennon case seems to have reached the
proper result. But the case still does not answer the question
for income tax purposes of whether the fee first should be at-
tributed to the client and then treated as passing to the at-
torney. In any event, although the estate tax treatment can
be helpful in our analysis of the nature of the rights created
under a contingency fee agreement, the estate tax treatment
should not be determinative of this issue because the income
tax and the estate tax are not in pari materia.122
B. Significance of the Contingency Fee Agreement Terms
One important factor in these cases is the contingency fee
agreement itself. If the terms of the agreement indicate that
the attorney is to be the client's employee, clearly the assign-
ment of income doctrine would apply to tax the client on the
recovery in the amount of the fee paid to the attorney.2 3 On
the other hand, if the contract shows that the attorney will be
in the position of a partner or joint venturer, the fee amount
should not be taxable to the client. 24 The Service has referred
to the importance of the wording of the contingency fee
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Comm'r, 160 F.2d 812 (2nd Cir. 1947).
123. See Bagley v. Comm'r, 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997).
124. See Estate of Clarks v. United States, 2000 FED App. 0020P (6th Cir.),
202 F.3d 854.
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agreement, as well as the applicable state law, in resolving
this issue.12 Case law has also recognized the importance of
the wording of the fee contract.
126
In determining whether the client is taxable on the fees,
one court recently stated that it should make no difference if
the fees are paid directly by the client to the attorney or paid
under a contingent fee agreement out of the recovery.2 7 But
in many instances, the way things are actually done is of con-
siderable importance in tax matters. For example, in Dean v.
Commissioner, the taxpayer and his wife owned all of the
stock of a corporation.2 8 They lived in a house that the wife
owned prior to their marriage.1 Their corporation was in-
debted to a bank for a substantial sum, and the bank required
that the residence be transferred to the corporation to use as
collateral for the loan.'3 ° The couple continued to live in the
house just as before.' The Government argued that the fair
rental value of the property should be included in the couple's
gross income because the title transfer to the corporation al-
125. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200107019 (Feb. 16, 2001). The letter ruling used the
language,
The Contingency Fee Agreement that you entered into with your attor-
ney on date 2, did not transfer any interest in the judgment or the
cause of action to your attorney. Instead, you used the proceeds of that
portion of the judgment you had not previously transferred to the Trust
to pay your attorney. Both the Contingent Fee Agreement itself and
the law of [state identity concealed] support this conclusion.
Id. T1 36. Private letter rulings may not be used or cited as precedent. See
I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (West 2001). They are useful, however, in gaining insight
into the views of the Service on particular issues.
126. See Bagley v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 396 (1995), affd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir.
1997). The Bagley case involved a plaintiff who received compensatory and pu-
nitive damages pursuant to a claim for tortious interference with future em-
ployment and an additional sum in settlement of claims for tortious interference
with future employment, libel and invasion of privacy. The plaintiff asserted
that the contingent legal fees paid to his attorney should be treated as a reduc-
tion of the amount that he received pursuant to the judgment or settlement of
the litigation. Addressing this issue, the Tax Court stated,
Based on the record, we find that there is nothing to indicate that the
parties intended the contingency fee arrangement to be a joint venture
or partnership. Mr. Rawlings testified that he regarded the agreement
between himself and petitioner as nothing more than an arrangement
for the payment for his services.
Id. at 419.
127. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
128. See Dean v. Comm'r, 187 F.2d 1019, 1019 (3rd Cir. 1951).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1020.
131. See id.
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lowed the couple to live rent-free in property owned by the
corporation."' The court agreed with the Government."'
Even though nothing had changed insofar as how they were
using their residence, the transfer of title to the corporation
resulted in income to them from the continued use of the
property.13
If an individual about to engage in business forms a cor-
poration, no one would doubt that the corporation would be
able to deduct all of its expenses from gross income instead of
being subject to the itemized deduction treatment applicable
to individual taxpayers."' Even though the individual would
run the business in exactly the same way that he would an
individual proprietorship, the tax results will be different. 13
Similarly, there is a significant difference between fees
paid under a contingency fee agreement and fees paid to an
attorney on the usual hourly charge basis. A contingency fee
agreement is not a subterfuge; it is a completely different ar-
rangement for paying legal fees. It enables a client to retain
the services of an attorney to prosecute a case, which would
not be possible if the client had to pay an attorney on an
hourly basis. In a contingency fee agreement, the attorney
assumes risks which are not present in the usual hourly fee
arrangement. In the hope of achieving substantial financial
gain at the end of the matter, the attorney risks committing
his time and effort to what might turn out to be a losing
cause. It therefore is difficult to simply disregard the unique
factual situation in a contingency fee arrangement.
A recent decision indicated that a broad concept of busi-
ness purpose should be applied in determining if a transac-
tion has economic substance. 17  In the typical case, a client
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1019.
134. See id.
135. See I.R.C. §§ 62, 63 (West 2001).
136. See also Lockard v. Commissioner, which points out the significance of
the manner in which transactions are conducted. Lockard v. Comm'r, 166 F.2d
409 (1st Cir. 1948). In that case, a woman set up a trust for the benefit of her
husband and made a transfer to it. She maintained that she should be treated
as the owner of the income until distribution was made to the trust. The court
stated, "But the fact is that she did not receive the income and then give it away
by successive assignments. Upon creating the trust she made a single transfer
whereby her husband then and there acquired an irrevocable right to the in-
come for a period of years." Id. at 412.
137. See United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th
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who cannot afford an attorney enters into a contingency fee
agreement with an attorney to prosecute litigation which the
client hopes will produce financial gain. The attorney, under
such an agreement, acquires an interest that is greater than
what he would have acquired under an hourly-charge fee ar-
rangement. Accordingly, it seems logical to contend that a
contingent fee agreement has economic substance, and there-
fore is covered by a broad concept of business purpose. Many
clients would not be able to pursue lawsuits if there were no
such agreements. For them, there is economic substance to
these arrangements, which enables them to recover funds
that often are necessary to sustain a reasonable livelihood.
Because a contingent fee agreement creates different in-
terests from those created by the normal fee agreement, the
change in form can bring about different tax consequences.
The terms of the agreement and the provisions of state law
which define the nature of the fee arrangement, bear on the
question of the control the client has retained over the fee-
an important factor in considering the application of the as-
signment of income doctrine.
C. Importance of the Control Factor
Although the Srivastava court took the position that the
Cir. 2001). This case involves the United Parcel Service of America, Inc.
('UPS"), whose practice in the early 1980s was to reimburse "customers for lost
or damaged parcels up to $100 in declared value. Above that level, UPS would
assume liability up to the parcel's declared value if the customer paid 25 [cents]
per additional $100 in declared value, the 'excess-value charge.'" Id. at 1016
(footnote omitted). UPS restructured this program as insurance provided by a
Bermuda subsidiary company. See id. UPS bought an insurance policy from a
company, which assumed the risk on excess value shipments in return for pre-
miums consisting of the excess value charges collected by UPS. See id. The in-
surance company entered into a reinsurance agreement with the Bermuda sub-
sidiary. See id. Under this arrangement, UPS did not report revenue from
these excess-valued charges, nor did it claim expenses relating to the charges.
See id. at 1016-17. The Service contended that the plan had no business pur-
pose and that the income should still be taxable to UPS. The Eleventh Circuit
held that the restructuring arrangement had real economic effects and a busi-
ness purpose and should be respected for tax purposes. The Eleventh Circuit
found that the term "business purpose" does not mean that a transaction must
be free from tax considerations. It concluded that a transaction has a "business
purpose" as long as the transaction relates to a bona fide profit-seeking busi-
ness. The court found that the transaction simply altered the form of an exist-
ing, validated business and, therefore, UPS had a proper business purpose,
which neutralized any tax-avoidance motive. See id. at 1019.
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client's control was the key to whether the assignment of in-
come doctrine applied, it expressed difficulty in defining "con-
trol."138 The court explained that in order to resolve the con-
trol issue, other factors had to be examined."9  Because
income is taxable to the person who earned it, a factor weigh-
ing in favor of attributing the fee solely to the attorney is the
fact that his services produced the income. 4 ° In Lucas v.
Earl, the fees in question were taxable solely to the person
who earned them.14' In a contingency fee arrangement, it is
the services of the attorney that produces the recovery, and
in Horst, the interest income was taxable solely to the person
who owned the property which produced the interest in-
come.' In a contingency fee agreement, the client is unable
to realize anything on his claim until the attorney's services
are obtained.'
In the case of personal services, control exists on the part
of the person providing the services. In a case like Horst,
which involves income-producing property, control exist on
the part of the person owning the property which produces
the income. Of course, that is the problem in contingency fee
contract cases. Who owned the tree that produced the in-
come? According to Cotnam v. Commissioner, it was the at-
torney who had an interest in the client's cause of action and
whose services produced the income in question.
But although the court in Srivastava ruled in favor of the
client, the language it used accorded with Lucas in noting
that "[tihere is nothing about arm's-length transactions that
need preclude anticipatory assignments in that context, how-
ever. To the contrary, a taxpayer who anticipatorily assigns
future streams of income to obtain services in return has
quite obviously procured a benefit." 46 An assignment of in-
come can result even though it was made at arm's length and
not as a gratuity."' This point made by the court in
138. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2000).
139. See id.
140. See id. at 361.
141. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
142. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 361.
143. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
144. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1959).
145. See id. at 126. For discussion of Cotnam, see infra Part VII.A.
146. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2000).
147. See United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973). In the Basye case, a
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Srivastava appears to be a valid one. Nothing in the assign-
ment of income cases limits that doctrine to situations where
gifts are made to family members, even though, as indicated
above, it does seem that the assignment of income doctrine
was created to prevent any tax advantage from resulting in
gratuitous transfers to family members. The primary reason
that the doctrine did not apply in Cotnam is because of the in-
terest in the claim given to the attorneys by the Alabama
Statute and the belief that the claim was worthless at the
time it was assigned by the client."' That the assignment was
not a gratuitous transfer to a relative was not treated as sig-
nificant.
In states where state law does not give the attorney an
interest comparable to that received by the attorneys in Cot-
nam under Alabama law, the assignment of income doctrine
could apply if the client retained significant control over the
property or right to income forming the basis of his cause of
action.'49 The Tax Court for a long period of time has held
that recoveries produced in connection with lawsuits are in-
cludable in their entirety in the gross income of the plaintiff,
who then is allowed a deduction for legal fees paid to the at-
torney.'
medical partnership agreed to supply medical services to members of a health
foundation. Part of the foundation's compensation to the partnership consisted
of payments into a retirement trust for the benefit of the physicians of the part-
nership. The Service asserted a deficiency against each partner of the partner-
ship for his distributive share of the amount paid by the foundation into the re-
tirement trust. The court stated, "The partnership earned the income and, as a
result of arm's-length bargaining with Kaiser, was responsible for its diversion
into the trust fund." Id. at 451 (footnote omitted). The court added,
Nor do we believe that the guiding principle of Lucas v. Earl may be so
easily circumvented. Kaiser's motives for making payment are irrele-
vant to the determination whether those amounts may fairly be viewed
as compensation for services rendered. Neither does Kaiser's apparent
insistence upon payment to the trust deprive the agreed contributions
of their character as compensation.
Id. at 451-52 (footnote omitted).
148. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
149. See Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
150. See Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 787 (1998);
Srivastava v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 638 (1998); Coady v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M.
(CCH) 257 (1998); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707 (1962); Kenseth v. Comm'r,
114 T.C. 399 (2000). In Kenseth, the Tax Court, in ruling in favor of the Com-
missioner, followed the O'Brien case, espoused the assignment of income doc-
trine and declined to base its decision on the effect of states' lien statutes. See
Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 411-12; see also I.R.C. § 212 (West 2001).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
VI. ATTORNEYS LIENS
An important aspect of resolving the income tax issue
raised by contingent fee agreements is whether the attorney
acquires an ownership interest in the eventual proceeds pro-
duced by his efforts, or only a lien against the proceeds. The
subject of liens might be examined in more detail.
Under the common law, and by statute in some states, an
attorney has a lien against a judgment or decree entered on
his or her client's behalf."' But under the common law, the
attorney would not have a lien on the cause of action itself."'
Some states have enacted statutes to remedy this situation
and have given attorneys a lien on the cause of action prior to
judgment."' A lien is "[a] legal right or interest that a credi-
tor has in another's property, lasting until a debt or duty that
it secures is satisfied. Typically, the creditor does not take
possession of the property on which the lien has been ob-
tained.""4 The lien resembles an assignment because it con-
fers on the attorney a priority right over later assignments
made by the client of an interest in the claim and over the
later claims of creditors against the client."'
There are two types of liens that an attorney can ac-
quire." '6 One is the general or retaining lien, which gives the
attorney the right to retain papers and property of the client
until the fee is paid."7 The second type of lien, the one with
which we are concerned, is the special or charging lien."5
That lien protects the attorney's interest in funds due the cli-
151. See J.G.B., Annotation, Attorney's Contract for Contingent Fee as
Amounting to an Equitable Assignment of Interest in Cause of Action, or Pro-
ceeds of Settlement Thereof, 124 A.L.R. 1508 (1940); see also Tuttle v. Wyman,
32 N.W.2d 742 (Neb. 1948); Cameron v. Boeger, 65 N.E. 690 (Ill. 1902); Scott v.
Kirtley, 152 So. 721 (Fla. 1933); Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 28 S.W. 90
(Tenn. 1894).
152. See J.G.B., supra note 151; see also Jennings v. Canady, 13 F.2d 356
(8th Cir. 1926); Desaman v. Butler Bros., 136 N.W. 747 (Minn. 1912).
153. See J.G.B., supra note 151; see also Barnes v. Verry, 191 N.W. 589
(Minn. 1923); O'Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 97 S.W. 150 (Mo. 1906); Robin-
son v. Rogers, 143 N.E. 647 (N.Y. 1924).
154. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (7th ed. 1999).
155. See F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 72-73
(1964).
156. See id. at 71-72.
157. See Jernryd v. Nilsson, 117 F.R.D. 416 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
158. See Hubbard v. Ellithorpe, 112 N.W. 796 (Iowa 1907); Reynolds v. War-
ner, 258 N.W. 462 (Neb. 1935).
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ent pursuant to a settlement or judgment.9 The enforcement
method of these liens differs among the various states. Be-
cause these liens are not based on possession but require the
attorney to have the court exercise its equitable power over
funds in its control, courts often refer to these liens as creat-
ing an equitable interest in funds over which they have con-
trol. 60 Accordingly, some courts use the term "equitable as-
signment" in referring to these liens.'6' Actual assignments,
as opposed to equitable assignments, have been held to be
against public policy if they relate to personal injury claims or
to claims transferred to an attorney for the purpose of insti-
tuting legal proceedings. 6 ' In some states, ethical rules relat-
ing to attorneys do not allow them to have a direct interest in
their client's suit.'63 The concept of a lien rather than an
ownership interest in the client's cause of action seems ap-
propriate where the contract between client and attorney
gives the client significant independent rights, such as the
right to settle the litigation without the attorney's consent
and the right to terminate the attorney's services before the
matter is concluded.
64
There are cases in various jurisdictions, however, that
distinguish between assignment of a personal injury claim
and the assignment of the proceeds of a personal injury re-
covery. The latter are held to be enforceable by these cases.'
In states that do not offer this protection to attorneys by way
of statute, attorneys have sought to protect themselves by
claiming that part of the cause of action belongs to them un-
der the doctrine of equitable assignment.'66 Under this doc-
159. See Hoover-Reynolds v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173 (Ct. App.
1996); Cohen v. Goldberger, 141 N.E. 656 (Ohio 1923).
160. See MACKINNON, supra note 155, at 72.
161. See id.; Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., v. Austin, 292 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1961).
162. For a detailed discussion of assignments and liens, see MACKINNON, su-
pra note 155, at 70-73.
163. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). See also infra note
257 relating to ethical rules in Wisconsin.
164. See MACKINNON, supra note 155, at 74-80.
165. See Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Assignability of Proceeds of Claim for
Personal Injury or Death, 33 A.L.R. 4th 82 (1984).
166. See J.G.B., supra note 151 at 1508. Under the common law, all assign-
ments of choses in action were invalid and unenforceable in courts of law. In
order to overcome this barrier, the English Court of Chancery in its administra-
tion of equitable principles developed the doctrine of equitable assignment. See
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trine, when the assignment is made, the assignee acquires a
present equitable right, which becomes an equitable property
right over the proceeds of the contingency when those pro-
ceeds come into existence.'67
The general rule seems to be that a contingency fee
agreement does not give rise to an equitable assignment of
the cause of action or of the proceeds of a settlement, if the
contract containing the fee agreement does not so provide.'
The same rule would apply even if the contract did provide for
an equitable assignment, if the cause of action, by its nature,
is non-assignable.'69
In light of the above, the relationship between client and
attorney, as expressed in the wording of the contingency fee
agreement can be very important in determining whether an
equitable assignment has taken place.
There are cases, however, which do not agree with the
above-stated general proposition.'" These cases hold that
under a contingency fee agreement, an attorney will have an
interest in the cause of action or in the proceeds that result
from the action."'
It, therefore, seems that the key question in any given
case will be whether a contingency fee agreement constitutes
an assignment of part of the client's cause of action, or
whether it merely provides a lien to the attorney that at-
taches to the recovery that his efforts produce. Because an
outright assignment of a claim to the attorney would be
against public policy unless permitted by state law,'7 courts
referring to an attorney having a right in the recovery equal
to that of the client typically use the term "equitable assign-
ment" in describing the nature of the arrangement.' That
distinction is very important because if the agreement in ef-
fect is treated as an outright assignment, the client can be
167. See id. at 1508-09.
168. See id. at 1509.
169. See id.
170. See, e.g., Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 69 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1934); N.
Tex. Traction Co. v. Clark & Sweeton, 272 S.W. 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); La
Fetra v. Hudson Trust Co., 197 N.Y.S. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1922), affd without opin-
ion, 142 N.E. 272 (1923).
171. For a detailed discussion of those cases holding that equitable assign-
ments do occur under contingency fee agreements and those cases holding that
they do not, see J.G.B., supra note 151.
172. See MACKINNON, supra note 155, at 72-73.
173. See, e.g., Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959).
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treated as having made a transfer of property to the attorney
so that the fee subsequently earned by the lawyer with re-
spect to that property will belong solely to the attorney.
174
The client will have no interest in that income because he will
no longer have an interest in the property giving rise to the
income.
On the other hand, if the attorney has only a lien against
the recovery, the recovery will be viewed as having passed
first to the client, then paid to the attorney for his fee.
175
There are situations, however, where a statutory provision
gives the attorney a lien on any amount recovered, which has
been interpreted as giving the attorney an interest in the re-
covery to the extent of his fee. 176 Even though the statute is
worded in terms of a "lien", which would be only a claim
against the property in question, the effect is the same as if
there were an assignment of the property to the attorney.
These cases reached that result even though the contract did
not specifically provide for an assignment. In the absence of a
statute, the terms of the contingent fee agreement can pro-
vide for an equitable assignment of a portion of the cause of
action in the amount of the fee. 77 However, as indicated
above, ethical problems can arise under state disciplinary
rules if an attorney is given an actual property interest in the
client's cause of action.
VII. THE ROLE OF STATE LAW
The cases that have been decided on this issue indicate
how important state law is in determining the interests that
the client and the attorney might have in the fee. The role
that state and federal law play in resolving federal tax ques-
174. The distinction between the assignment of income and the assignment
of an asset which produces income was recognized in the recent case of Kenseth
v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
175. See Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 378 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2001).
176. It has been held that a charging lien of an attorney is not merely an en-
forceable right against the property recovered, but is an equitable ownership
interest in the cause of action. See LMWT Realty Corp. v. Davis Agency, 649
N.E.2d 1183 (N.Y. 1995).
177. See Camp v. Park, 295 S.W.2d 613 (Ark. 1956); Costigan v. Stewart, 91
P. 83 (Kan. 1907); Svea Assurance Co. v. Packham, 48 A. 359 (Md. 1901).
178. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT 1.08(h) (1989)
(providing that an attorney cannot be given a proprietary interest in a client's
cause of action or subject matter of litigation). See also Kenseth, 259 F.3d at
881.
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tions was determined in the case of Lyeth v. Hoey. 78 In that
case, a woman died in Massachusetts, leaving as her heirs
four children and two grandchildren. 8° Her will left small
legacies to her heirs, but the large residuary estate was left to
a trust. 8 ' The heirs objected to the will when it was offered
for probate on the grounds that there had been a lack of tes-
tamentary capacity and undue influence. 8 When the probate
court granted a motion for the framing of issues for jury trial,
all parties in interest entered into a compromise agreement.
The distribution received by the petitioner, one of the grand-
sons of the deceased, was treated as income by the govern-
ment.' The petitioner argued that the amount received
should be exempt from tax because the applicable federal
statute exempted from income property received by gift, be-
quest, devise, or inheritance.'
The question, therefore, became whether an amount re-
ceived under an agreement settling a will contest brought by
an heir should be treated as "acquired by inheritance." 86 The
court of appeals held that the law of the jurisdiction under
which the taxpayer received the property should determine
whether the property was received by inheritance.'87 But the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusion of inheri-
tances from income granted by the federal statute was a fed-
eral question.'88 The Court ruled that the petitioner's status
as an heir was properly determined by Massachusetts law.'
Accordingly, state law determined what rights parties have in
property, but once those rights were determined, federal law
determined how they would be taxed." ° The Lyeth Court con-
cluded that the petitioner received the distribution as an in-
179. 305 U.S. 188 (1938).




184. See id. at 190-91.
185. The relevant statute in the case was section 22(b)(3) of the Revenue Act
of 1932. Section 102(a) of the current Internal Revenue Code exempts the same
items from income. See I.R.C. § 102(a) (1994).
186. See Lyeth, 305 U.S. at 189.
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heritance. 9' What the petitioner received from the estate, he
received in his capacity as an heir, and the compromise
agreement was merely the means utilized to arrive at the
proper amount of the distribution.'92
Almost thirty years later, in Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch,'93 the Supreme Court had occasion to clarify the ques-
tion of what constitutes state law that is binding on the fed-
eral government and the federal courts. According to Bosch,
only where state law is determined by the highest court of the
state in question is it controlling for federal tax purposes.9 4 If
the highest court of the state has not ruled on the question,
then federal authorities should apply what they believe to be
the state law after giving consideration to decisions by other
courts of the state.9
The question of the validity of assignments made in con-
nection with a contingent fee agreement is a question of state
law.9 In Blair v. Commissioner,'97 the Supreme Court held
that where the income beneficiary of a trust assigned his in-
terest in the trust to others, the validity of the assignments
was controlled by state law (Illinois).'98 The question of
whether the assignor was still taxable on the income from the
trust was held to be a federal question.9 Whether state or
federal law applies in any particular factual situation is not
always a simple matter to resolve.
A. State Law in Cotnam v. Commissioner
The importance of state law on this issue can be seen in
the much-discussed case of Cotnam v. Commissioner.0° In
Cotnam, a man promised to leave a woman one-fifth of his es-
tate if she would care for him for the rest of his life. °1 She
faithfully performed her part of the agreement. °2 When the
191. See id. at 196.
192. See id. at 197.
193. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
194. See id. at 465.
195. See id.
196. See Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); cf. Schulze v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.M.
(CCH) 143 (1983).
197. See Blair, 300 U.S. at 5.
198. See id. at 9-10.
199. See id. at 11.
200. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
201. See id. at 120.
202. See id.
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man died intestate, the woman brought suit against the ad-
ministrator of his estate and successfully recovered the sum
of $120,000 under her contract with the deceased."' The sum
of $50,365.83 was paid to her attorneys out of the judgment
rendered in her favor. °4 One of the primary issues in the case
was whether the woman should be treated as having received
that part of the judgment as income prior to paying it over to
her attorneys as a fee. 25 The court, in ruling for Mrs. Cot-
nam, based its decision primarily on the Alabama statute
which provided that attorneys had the same right and power
as their clients over suits, judgments, and decrees to enforce
their liens.206 The court cited with approval the Fifth Circuit
case of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Levy,0 7
which held that the Alabama statute creates an equitable as-
signment or equitable lien in the cause of action.!0 8 Accord-
203. See id. at 121.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 125. Title 46 of the 1940 Code of Alabama, as quoted in Cot-
nam, provided:
§ 64. Lien of attorneys at law.
2. Upon suits, judgments, and decrees for money, they shall have a lien
superior to all liens but tax liens, and no person shall be at liberty to
satisfy said suit, judgment or decree, until the lien or claim of the at-
torney for his fees is fully satisfied; and attorneys at law shall have the
same right and power over said suits, judgments and decrees, to en-
force their liens, as their clients had or may have for the amount due
thereon to them.
Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125 n.5.
207. See id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Levy, 77 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.
1935)).
208. It seems that only New York has an attorney charging lien statute that
protects attorneys to the same degree as the charging lien statute in Alabama.
See Thad Austin Davis, Cotnain v. Commissioner and the Income Tax Treat-
ment of Contingency-Based Attorney Fees-The Alabama Attorney's Charging
Lien Meets Lucas v. Earl Head-On, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1683, 1718 (2000). The New
York statute provides as follows:
From the commencement of an action, special or other proceeding in
any court or before any state, municipal or federal department, except
a department of labor, or the service of an answer containing a coun-
terclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his cli-
ent's cause of action, claim or counter-claim, which attaches to a ver-
dict, report, determination, decision, judgment or final order in his
client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may
come; and the lien cannot be affected by any settlement between the
parties before or after judgment, final order or determination. The
court upon the petition of the client or attorney may determine and en-
force the lien.
N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 475 (McKinney 1983).
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ingly, the court in Cotnam held that the attorneys had an eq-
uity in Mrs. Cotnam's cause of action.
Two of the judges, Rives and Brown, expressed the view
that Mrs. Cotnam's claim had no fair market value, and that
it was doubtful and uncertain if it had any value at all."9
They contended that her claim was worthless when she en-
tered into the contingent fee agreement, that she had not re-
alized any income from it, and that the only use she could
make of it was to transfer part of it to the attorneys with the
hope that they would be able to effect a recovery on her
claim.210 Therefore, she could not assign anything of value to
her attorneys, nor was there anything of value over which she
211
could exercise control so as to benefit her attorneys. It was
the work of the attorneys that produced the recovery out of
which their fee was paid.
The Government argued that Mrs. Cotnam was legally
obligated to pay the fees. Payment of fees out of the judg-
ment, based on her services performed under a contract with
the deceased, was the equivalent of Mrs. Cotnam's receipt of
the sum representing the attorneys' fees."' In other words,
she had already earned the right to receive the funds, and by
permitting part of the recovery to be paid to her attorneys as
fees, she exercised control over the beneficial enjoyment of the
funds. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wisdom used the
same reasoning contending that prior to the agreement with
her attorney, Mrs. Cotnam had completed her services under
the contract with the deceased, and even though she had not
received the income, she had earned it. 2 1  She controlled the
disposition of the entire amount and directed that part of it be
paid to her attorneys. 4 Despite these arguments, the court
held that Mrs. Cotnam was never personally obligated to pay
the fees.215 The fees could only be paid out of the judgment if
her attorneys were successful in litigating her claim.1 6
Judge Wisdom's reasoning sounds logical because Mrs.
Cotnam had already performed services under her contract
209. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 125-26.
212. See id. at 126; see also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
213. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 127.
214. See id. at 127; see also Horst, 311 U.S. at 112.
215. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126.
216. See id.
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with the deceased at the time the contingent fee agreement
with her attorneys was executed. But because the amount of
her claim was uncertain, doubtful and contingent, the major-
ity opinion appropriately determined that Mrs. Cotnam had
not received the benefit of any economic gain within the doc-
trine set forth in Horst.21 ' But even if the claim were treated
as sufficiently definite to support an assignment of income
argument, that argument would run up against the Alabama
statute, which gave the attorneys and Mrs. Cotnam equal
rights in the suit and judgment. '18 As indicated above, Cot-
nam was primarily based on the rights conferred on the at-
torneys by the Alabama statute.
The focus of Cotnam, however, appears to be correct be-
cause state law determines the interests that the parties have
in property, and federal law then determines how these inter-
ests are taxed."9 It therefore is necessary first to apply the
Alabama statute and next consider the question of taxation
under federal law. Put another way, we can bypass the ques-
tion regarding the certainty of Mrs. Cotnam's claim because
the Alabama statute provides that attorneys have the same
rights as their client in the amount of their fees. At the in-
stant that the recovery takes place, the amount of the fee is
treated as property of the attorney.22 °
B. Srivastava v. Commissioner Reluctantly Follows Cotnam
Another Fifth Circuit decision that reached the same re-
sult as Cotnam is the previously referred to case of Srivastava
v. Commisioner.2 ' The facts in that case were similar to
those in Cotnam, except that Texas law, rather than Alabama
law, was involved, and the claim in Srivastava was based on
alleged defamation rather than personal services rendered
under a contractual agreement. In Texas, an attorney's lien
is based on common law, not on a statute as in Alabama.222
217. See id. at 126; see also Horst, 311 U.S. at 112. As will be discussed later
in the article, this position would seem to be even more compelling in a tort ac-
tion based on an alleged defamation or similar tort, where the damages were
not subject to computation under the terms of a contract.
218. See supra note 206.
219. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 188 (1938).
220. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
221. 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
222. See Thomson v. Findlater Hardware Co., 156 S.W. 301 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913).
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The lien gives the attorney the right to be satisfied out of the
property,223 but the lien applies only to the funds once they
are collected. 24 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Dennis
pointed out that "under Texas law, unlike that of Alabama,
an attorney is not granted by statute the same right and
power as his client over the client's cause of action and judg-
ment for the independent enforcement of his attorney's fee
claim.""2 Judge Dennis indicated that in Texas, the attor-
ney's rights remain derivative from the client's, even where
the attorney has received an ownership interest in the cause
of action by assignment from the client. 6 The relationship is
one of principal and agent. 7 Based on the differences in the
Alabama and Texas attorney's lien laws, the Government
asked the court to distinguish the case from Cotnam"'
The court in Srivastava, nevertheless, reluctantly ruled
in favor of the taxpayer because it felt obligated to follow the
prior Fifth Circuit case law that was "substantially indistin-
guishable." 9 The court did not consider the difference be-
tween the Alabama and Texas lien law, and indicated that
whatever rights were given to the attorney under state lien
law to proceed against the defendant should not determine
the question of taxability as between the attorney and the cli-
ent.
230
223. See Crutcher v. Cont'l Nat'l Bank, 884 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App. 1994).
224. See Thomson, 156 S.W. at 303; see also Bernard J. Grant, III, No Taxa-
tion Without Realization: Srivastava v. Commissioner, The Fifth Circuit's An-
swer to Tax Treatment of Attorney's Fees Under a Contingency Fee Agreement,
32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 363, 374 n.95 (2001).
225. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 369 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see Grant, supra
note 224, at 376.
226. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 369 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see Grant, supra
note 224, at 376.
227. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 369 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
228. See id. at 363.
229. See id. at 357.
230. A recent Tax Court case refers to the fact that the court, on many occa-
sions, has decided these types of cases by distinguishing the lien statutes of
other states from the Alabama statute involved in Cotnam. See Kenseth v.
Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 410, 412 (2000). But it declined to decide that case based
on the effect of the lien statutes. See id. at 412. Rejecting that approach, the
Srivastava court quoted with approval the Tax Court decision in O'Brien v.
Commissioner, where the court stated,
[We think it doubtful that the Internal Revenue Code was intended to
turn upon such refinements. For, even if the taxpayer had made an ir-
revocable assignment of a portion of his future recovery to his attorney
to such an extent that he never thereafter became entitled thereto even
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Disposing of the state lien law analysis does not solve
this problem. There is still the question of whether the tax-
payer's cause of action had value and whether the taxpayer
had control over the value-the ground on which Judges
Rives and Brown relied in Cotnam.23" ' That raises the ques-
tion of whether the client's claim was worthless or of uncer-
tain value, in which case the assignment of income doctrine
would not apply.
The Srivastava court believed the applicability of the doc-
trine depended on the client's degree of dominion and control
over the asset. 32 Although ruling in favor of the client, the
court favored the view that the assignment of income doctrine
really should apply."'3 It did, however, acknowledge that the
assignment of income doctrine is not applicable where an as-
signment is made of an entire claim of uncertain value."4 But
it indicated that if it were deciding the case on a "tabula
rasa," it might be inclined to include contingent fees in the
gross income of the client.23 The court reasoned that the
same result should follow whether the attorney is compen-
sated under a non-contingent arrangement or under a contin-
gent fee agreement."6 Under a non-contingent arrangement,
a client would be treated as receiving the entire amount of
the recovery and then using part of it to compensate his at-
torney. The court observed that there was no reason to give
different treatment to fees paid under contingent fee ar-
for a split second, it would still be gross income to him under the famil-
iar principles of [Earl and Horst].
Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 364 n.34 (quoting O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707, 712
(1962), affd, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963)) (alteration in original).
231. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1959).
232. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363-64.
233. The court indicated its inclination toward the doctrine when it stated
the following:
Similarly, Cotnam is indistinguishable from the instant cases, and thus
however the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine applies in one
case, principles of consistency dictate that the doctrine applies simi-
larly in the other. Rightly or wrongly, this court in Cotnam decided not
to apply the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine to contingent
fee agreement. What the Commissioner and the dissent urge, in effect,
is that we use whatever means necessary to avoid Cotnam. The Tax
Court has already rejected that approach, and we do so as well.
See id. at 364 n.33.
234. See id. at 359 (citing Jones v. Comm'r, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962)).
235. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 357.
236. See id.
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rangements" 7
As pointed out in Srivastava, cases involving contingency
fee agreements are difficult because they do not involve a
straight assignment of income where the assignor retains the
property producing the income or a clear divestiture of the
property producing the income. 2" The court in Srivastava
characterized the claim as being subject to a "sort of virtual
co-ownership-'like an interest in a partnership agreement or
joint venture."'239 The court believed that "attorney retainer
agreements accompanied by contingent fee provisions assign
more than just the fruit-and yet divest clients of something
less than the entire tree."24"
The importance of state law in analyzing these arrange-
ments was shown again in Estate of Clarks v. United States.24'
In that case, which was based on Michigan law, the attorney's
242lien arose by way of common law rather than by statute.
The Sixth Circuit found that there was no significant differ-
ence between a common law lien and the lien created by stat-
ute in Cotnam. The court explained that a common law at-
torney's lien was
"a peculiar lien, to be enforced by peculiar methods. It
was a device invented by the courts for the protection of
attorneys against the knavery of their clients, by disabling
clients from receiving the fruits of recoveries without pay-
ing for the valuable services by which the recoveries were
obtained.... If the fund recovered was in possession or
under the control of the court, it would not allow the client
to obtain it until he had paid his attorney, and in adminis-
tering the fund it would see that the attorney was pro-
tected .... .
Although the underlying claim for personal injury was
originally owned by the client, the client lost his right to
receive payment for the lawyer's portion of the judg-
ment.242
237. Id.
238. See id. at 360.
239. Id. (quoting from Estate of Clarks v. United States, 2000 FED App.
0020P (6th Cir.), 202 F.3d 854, 857).
240. Id.
241. 2000 FED App. 0020P (6th Cir.), 202 F.3d 854.
242. See Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856.
243. Id. (quoting RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
(2d ed. 1955), quoting Goodrich v. McDonald, 19 N.E. 649 (N.Y. 1889)).
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The court pointed out the similarity with Cotnam in that the
client's claim was speculative and required the services of
counsel. 2" The court described the arrangement as resem-
bling a partnership agreement or joint venture, and referred
to the client's assignment as creating a lien on part of the
judgment, which transferred ownership of that part of the
judgment to the attorney.245 Furthermore, the court described
the transaction as being more like a division of property,
rather than an assignment, and referred to the client as
transferring some of the trees that he owned to the attorney
who then had to use his efforts to produce the fruit."6 The
court concluded that the income belonged to the party who
earned and received it.
247
It appears that the Service has recognized the signifi-
cance of state law relating to attorneys' liens in contingency
fee arrangements. In a private letter ruling, the Service dis-
tinguished the factual situation in Cotnam on the ground that
the state law involved in the ruling gave the attorney only a
lien, whereas in Cotnam, the Alabama statute gave the attor-
ney an equitable assignment or equitable lien in the cause of
action.4 8
The Eleventh Circuit joined the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
in holding that income does not result to the client in contin-
gency fee agreement cases. In Davis v. Commissioner, the
Government conceded that the court was bound by the Cot-
nam decision in the former Fifth Circuit, but, nevertheless,
sought to have the court overrule Cotnam.49 In the alterna-
tive, the Government contended that Mrs. Davis had made a
disposition of property when she entered into the contingency
fee agreement." '° It argued that the value of her cause of ac-
tion and the value of the attorney's services were not ascer-
tainable in the year the parties entered into the agreement.
The Government attempted to assert the open transaction
doctrine to ascribe the timing of their ascertainability. 25' The
244. See id.
245. See id. at 857.
246. See id. at 857-58.
247. See id. at 858.
248. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200107019 (Nov. 16, 2000).
249. See Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000).
250. See id. at 1347.
251. See id. at 1348. The Government attempted to assert the open transac-
tion doctrine on which Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), was based, so that
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Government argued that under the open transaction doctrine,
receipt of income by the client was delayed until the judgment
was handed down and the value of the cause of action and the
attorney's fees became determinable.252 The Davis court re-
jected that position, responding that the open transaction
doctrine was only available where the value of at least one
side of the transaction was determinable, and the Govern-
ment was unable to establish the value of one side or the
other.253
Another position that supports the view that attorneys'
fees should be included in the gross income of the client is
that under the ethical rules applicable to the bar in a particu-
lar state, an attorney cannot acquire a proprietary interest in
his client's lawsuit.254 The Seventh Circuit in Kenseth re-
ferred to the Wisconsin State Rule of Professional Conduct,
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.8(j), which provides that although a
lawyer in Wisconsin can acquire a lien or enter into a contin-
gent fee contract, "neither a lien nor a contractual right is
'proprietary."'2 55 One Tax Court judge, however, pointed out
that the disciplinary rules are not promulgated to "affect the
substantive legal rights of lawyers and are not designed to be
a basis for civil liability."256 It seems doubtful that the Wis-
consin rule was intended to prevent lawyers from acquiring a
proprietary interest in contingent fee matters.257  The com-
ment accompanying this rule refers to the general rule that
lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest
in litigation, but goes on to point out that there are "specific
exceptions," such as in the case of reasonable contingent
the taxable event could be delayed until Ms. Davis won her judgment in 1992
and the value of the cause of action and the attorney's fees became determin-
able. See Davis, 210 F.3d at 1348.
252. See Davis, 210 F.3d at 1348.
253. See id.
254. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 414 (2000), affd, 259 F.3d 881
(7th Cir. 2001).
255. Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883-84.
256. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 436 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
257. The Wisconsin court rule provides:
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action
or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, ex-
cept that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses;
and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.8(j) (2000) (emphasis added).
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fees. 58 One should note that the Fifth Circuit in Srivastava
ruled in favor of the client despite a Texas disciplinary rule,
which is similar to the one in Wisconsin.259
VIII. AUTHORITY FOR INCLUSION IN CLIENT'S GROSS INCOME
Despite the decisions by the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits on this issue,6 ° five circuits have ruled the other way
and held that gross income in the amount of the fee does re-
sult to the client where an action is successfully prosecuted
under a contingency fee agreement.261
In the Federal Circuit case of Baylin v. United States,262 a
partnership received a condemnation award when 137 acres
of its land were condemned by the State Roads Commission. 63
The partnership appealed the award and entered into a con-
tingency fee agreement with its attorney, under which the at-
torney would receive a percentage of any recovery above the
original award. 64 Eventually the matter settled and the at-
torney was paid his fee directly out of the condemnation
award.265 The partnership claimed that the attorney's fee was
not part of its gross income because the fee was paid directly
to the attorney. It also relied on a Maryland statute that
258. The comment provides as follows:
Acquisition of Interest in Litigation
Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are pro-
hibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general
rule, which has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance,
is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and contin-
ued in these rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees
set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for certain advances of the costs
of litigation set forth in paragraph (e).
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.8 (Comment) (emphasis added). Rule 20:1.5(c) provides
that a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and indicate whether other
expenses should be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. See
WIS. SuP. CT. R. 20:1.5(c). The Rule provides in part, "Upon conclusion of a con-
tingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement
stating the outcome of the matter and if there is a recovery, showing the remit-
tance to the client and the method of its determination." Id. (emphasis added).
259. See infra note 315.
260. See discussion supra Part I.
261. See O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707 (1962), affd, 319 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir.
1963); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Kenseth v.Comm'r, 114
T.C. 399 (2000), affd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d
1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
262. 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
263. See id. at 1452.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 1453.
796 [Vol. 42
2002] TAXATION OF CONTINGENCY FEES 797
gave an attorney a lien on "attorney's fees and compensations
specially agreed on with the attorney's client.,
266
267On the basis of the holding in Lucas, the court rejected
the argument that the attorney's fee was not part of the part-
nership income because it was paid directly to the attorney.
The partnership received the benefits of these funds, which
were used to satisfy its obligation to the attorney. In addi-
tion, the fact that the partnership made the assignment of the
recovery before its exact amount was determined did not con-
vince the court that the partnership never had a right to it.
The court stated that the uncertainty of the legal fees at the
time of the assignment could not control the tax results: "the
temporary uncertain magnitude of the legal fees under such
an arrangement and the vehicle of an assignment cannot dic-
tate the income tax treatment of those fees."268 The court, fur-
thermore, held that the Maryland statute did not confer an
ownership interest, but merely created a lien that was a
charge on the fund for the debt owed to the attorney.
2 69
Baylin, however, can be distinguished from the cases in
the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. The cases in those
circuits were either based on state law or the control factor
266. Id. at 1455.
267. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
268. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455.
269. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454. The Maryland statute involved in the Bay-
lin case provided:
§ 10-501. Attorney's lien
(a) In general-subject to subsection (b) of this section, an attorney at
law has a lien on:
(1) an action or proceeding of a client of the attorney at law from
the time the action or proceeding beings; and
(2) a judgment or reward that a client receives as a result of legal
services that the attorney at law performs.
(b) Limited to fee agreement. -A lien under this section attaches only
if, an to the extent that, under a specific agreement between an attor-
ney at law and a client, the client owes the attorney at law a fee or
other compensation for legal services that produced the judgement or
award.
(c) Subordination of lien. -A lien under this section is subordinate only
to:
(1) a prior lien for wages due to an employee of the client for work
related to the judgement or award; or
(2) a lien for taxes that the client owes the state.
(d) Execution. -An attorney may retain property subject to a lien under
this section and bring an action for execution under the lien only in ac-
cordance with rules that the Court of Appeals adopts.
MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC. & PROF. § 10-501.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
which favored the client's position." ' In addition, in Baylin,
the partnership (client) had already received a jury award in
the condemnation proceeding in the amount of $3,899,000,
plus interest and costs, when it decided to appeal and enter
into a contingency fee agreement with its attorney.2 ' Under
the contingency fee agreement, the partnership agreed to pay
the attorney a percentage of any amount received above the
previous award.' Although the exact amount due under the
award had not yet been finally determined,'7 3 it seemed clear
that the claim of the partnership did have a definite value.'
Because no ownership interest in the partnership's claim was
transferred to the attorney, the total amount of the recovery
belonged to the partnership. When it permitted the attorney
to receive his fee directly out of the recovery, the partnership
received the benefit of satisfying its obligation for legal fees in
that manner. ' The Maryland statute could not support the
plaintiffs position because it provided only a lien to the at-
torney rather than an ownership interest. Additionally, the
claim was sufficiently definite and in the control of the plain-
tiff.76 Under these facts, it was foreseeable that the court
would apply the assignment of income doctrine to rule against
the plaintiff.
Coady v. Commissioner also holds that the assignment of
income doctrine is applicable in a contingency fee contract
case.' That case involved a woman who had brought suit
against the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation alleging
that she had been wrongfully discharged from her position. 7 '
She retained a law firm on a contingency fee basis.7 9 The
court found in her favor; she received the full payment of the
270. See supra notes 221-25. For example, attorneys in Texas do not acquire
an ownership interest in the client's cause of action; they acquire a lien, which
gives them a right to be satisfied out of the property or funds once they are col-
lected. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
271. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1452.
272. See id.
273. Eventually, the amount due to the partnership under the award was
settled for $16,319,522.91, and the court entered a judgment to that effect. See
id. at 1453.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 1454.
276. See id. at 1455.
277. Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
278. See id. at 1187.
279. See id.
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judgment, and subsequently paid her attorneys their fee. The
Service found a deficiency in Mrs. Coady and her husband's
failure to include this amount as part of their gross income.
The Tax Court ruled against the Coadys.28' On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit had to interpret Alaska law and concluded that
the statute2"' did not transfer an ownership interest in the cli-
ent's cause of action to the attorneys.282 Acknowledging the
significance of state law in cases of that kind, the court
stated, "This case is unlike Cotnam and Clarks because under
Alaska law, attorneys do not have a superior lien or owner-
ship interest in the cause of action as they do in Alabama and
Michigan."28' The court cited Lucas and Horst in concluding
that Coady received the benefit of her economic gain (judg-
ment), and therefore could not avoid being taxed on it simply
by deflecting income to another party (attorney).2 4 It did not
matter that Coady (taxpayer) did not actually receive the
judgment (income) if she received its benefit by transferring it
to someone else. Coady counter-argued that at the time of the
contingency fee agreement, there was real doubt as to the
amount recoverable under her claim. 28 But the court rejected
280. See id. at 1187-88.
281. Section 34.35.430 of the Alaska Statutes provided as follows:
(a) An attorney has a lien for compensation, whether specially agreed
upon or implied, as provided in this section
(1) first, upon the papers of the client that have come into the pos-
session of the attorney in the course of the professional employ-
ment;
(2) second, upon money in the possession of the attorney belonging
to the client;
(3) third, upon money in the possession of the adverse party in an
action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, from the
giving of notice of Lien to that party;
(4) fourth, upon a judgment to the extent of the costs included in
the judgment or, if there is a special agreement, to the extent of
the compensation specially agreed on, from the giving of notice of
the lien to the party against whom the judgment is given and filing
the original with the clerk where the judgment is entered and
docketed.
(b) This lien is, however, subordinate to the rights existing between the
parties to the action or proceeding.
ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.430 (Michie 2001).
282. See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190.
283. Id. at 1187 (distinguishing Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.
1959), and Estate of Clarks v. United States, 2000 FED App. 0020P (6th Cir.),
202 F.3d 854) (emphasis added).
284. See id. at 1191.
285. See id.
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this argument, replying, "we have previously held that the
fact that such an assignment involves a contingent amount
does not alter the conclusion that taxation cannot be escaped
by making anticipatory arrangements to prevent earnings
from vesting in the person who earned it."286
The Coady court rejected the Coady's argument that be-
cause the assignment involved a contingent amount, the as-
signment of income doctrine should not apply.287 In doing so,
the court relied on its prior decision in Kochansky v. Com-
misioner, but Kochansky is not directly on point. 8' In Cot-
nam, Judges Rives and Brown emphasized that Mrs. Cot-
nam's claim had no fair market value, and that it was
doubtful and uncertain as to whether it had any value at
all..2 " The claim was worthless without her retaining capable
attorneys to convert the claim into something of value. Dis-
senting Judge Wisdom also emphasized the nature of the
claim in contending that at the time of the assignment, all of
the services of the client had been rendered and all of the in-
come earned.29 ° In other words, Judges Rives, Brown and
Wisdom all based their opinions on the value that they at-
tributed to the client's claim. In contrast, the court in Coady
did not attribute any significance to the value of the claim,
holding that the uncertainty of the contingent amount did not
prevent the assignment of income doctrine from applying.
The Ninth Circuit in Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner291
followed Coady. In Benci-Woodward, plaintiffs were employ-
ees of Target Stores. Their suit arose out of an employer in-
vestigation and alleged false imprisonment, defamation, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy, breach of an implied-in-fact em-
ployment contract, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, constructive discharge, and intentional
misrepresentations."'2 The petitioners entered into a contin-
gency fee arrangement, which gave their attorney a lien on
any recovery in the case. The agreement contained the fol-
286. Id.; see also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940).
287. See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1191.
288. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
289. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1959).
290. See id.
291. 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000).
292. See id. at 942.
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lowing provisions:
Client agrees to pay Attorney for services a sum equal to
forty percent (40%) of any amounts received or recovered
in this matter on behalf of Client. Attorney may retain his
share out of the amount finally collected by settlement or
judgement, herein termed "recovery", in full for the ser-
vices and any advanced cost. Attorney is given first lien
and assignment on any recovery however procured to the
extent of this contract and such amounts may be retained
there from. Attorney is given a further lien and assign-
ment on any sums recovered herein for fees incurred for
all legal work performed for Client whatsoever and such
amounts shall be in addition to the contingent fee and cost
provided for in this agreement.
293
The plaintiffs won the jury trial.29 They agreed that the
part of their award representing punitive damages should be
included in their gross income, but they contended that the
part of the punitive damages retained by their attorney as
fees and cost should be excluded from gross income. 95
In light of the unusual nature of the tort claims raised by
the plaintiff-employees, it seems that there was room to argue
that the assignment of income doctrine was not applicable.
The terms of the contract, however, were a factor weighing
against the taxpayer. Furthermore, the California cases on
which the Ninth Circuit relied in Benci-Woodward clearly in-
dicate that, in California, a contingent fee contract does not
give the attorney any rights in the client's cause of action, but
gives him a lien only on the property recovered. 96
293. Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 787 (1998).
294. See id. at 943.
295. See id.
296. The court in Benci-Woodward indicated,
Under California law, an attorney lien does not confer any ownership
interest upon attorneys or grant attorneys any right and power over
the suits, judgments, or decrees of their clients. The California Su-
preme Court explained that in whatever terms one characterizes an at-
torney's lien under a contingent fee contract, it is no more than a secu-
rity interest in the proceeds of the litigation .... While there is
occasional language in cases in the effect that the attorney also be-
comes the equitable owner of a share of the client's cause of action, we
stated more accurately in Fifield Manor v. Finston that contingent fee
contracts "do not operate to transfer a part of the cause of action to the
attorney but only give him a lien upon his client's recovery."
Benci-Woodward, 219 F.3d at 943 (citations omitted).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The Fourth Circuit in Young v. Commissioner297 ruled
that the client was taxable on fees that were paid to her at-
torneys out of the sale proceeds of property under a contin-
gency fee agreement. Mrs. Young contended that her former
husband owed the legal fees to her attorneys in connection
with the settlement of a divorce proceeding, under which Mrs.
Young was awarded reasonable attorney's fees in addition to
a principal sum and interest. 9 ' The court referred to both
Cotnam and Clarks but disagreed with the holdings in those
cases, concluding that the uncertainty of the contingent fee
does not require its exclusion from the income of the as-
signor.299
The court also stated that there is "no relevant distinc-
tion between the state common law discussed in Clarks and
Baylin, yet those courts reached opposite conclusions. '"300
Young, however, failed to attribute appropriate significance to
a Maryland statute that clearly provided only a lien to attor-
neys.3' In contrast, Clarks was based on the common law of
Michigan, which the Sixth Circuit determined gave the attor-
ney an ownership interest in the fee in a manner similar to
that provided by the Alabama statute in Cotnam.°'
Young, however, indicated that under the Michigan law
involved in Clarks, the attorney really only received a lien on
a judgment rather than an ownership interest, as was the
case in Cotnam. As support, the Young court cited Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Starkey, a Michigan case holding
that an attorney's lien in the state is only a lien on the judg-
297. 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001).
298. See id. at 376.
299. See id. at 378. The court in Young indicated that although Cotnam and
Clarks resolved the tax issue on the basis of the attorney's claim under state
law, "whether amounts paid directly to attorneys under a contingent fee agree-
ment should be included within the client's gross income should be resolved by
proper application of federal income tax law, not the amount of control state law
grants to an attorney over the client's cause of action." Id. The court in Young
also noted that to follow Cotnam and Clarks, "would permit a client to avoid
taxation by 'skillfully devising' the method for paying her attorneys' fees . . .
Id. at 377.
300. Id. at 378.
301. See Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
302. See Estate of Clarks v. United States, 2000 FED App. 0020P (6th Cir.),
202 F.3d 854, 856. For discussions of Cotnam, Clarks, and Baylin, see supra
Part VILA, supra text accompanying notes 241-50, and supra text accompany-
ing notes 262-79, respectively.
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ment . The Clarks court relied on Drieband v. Candler, a
Michigan Supreme Court case decided in 1911, to hold that
an attorney's lien in Michigan provides an ownership inter-
est.34 According to Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, the fed-
eral courts and authorities are bound by the law of a state as
determined by its highest court in determining a person's in-
terests in property. 35 The 1982 Aetna case was a decision of
an intermediate court; the Clarks court, therefore, justifiably
referred to the Michigan law as determined by its highest
court. Despite this, the two conflicting Michigan decisions do
place the current state of the Michigan law on attorneys' liens
somewhat in doubt and tend to weaken the Clarks decision.
The Young court went on to state that it did not agree
with Cotnam and Clarks in their reliance on state law be-
cause this matter involves a federal tax issue.0 6 The decision
appears to be incorrect on that point. As indicated above, Ly-
eth v. Hoey and Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch point out
that federal tax law yields to state law with respect to deter-
mining the interests that people have in property.0 7 Young
also indicated that even if state law were determinative, un-
der the North Carolina common law relevant to the case, an
attorney's lien attaches only to the judgment and not to the
cause of action.0 ' The court's strongly worded opinion con-
cludes that a contingent fee agreement does not give the at-
torney an interest in the client's cause of action, and the fact
that the assignment "involves a contingent or undetermined
amount does not exempt it from taxation to the assignor."0 9
At the time that the wife and attorney entered into the
contingency fee agreement in Young, the amount of any re-
covery the wife would eventually receive in a divorce proceed-
ing was speculative and uncertain. Although the court stated
303. See Young, 240 F.3d at 379 n.7; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Starkey, 323
N.W.2d 325, 328 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
304. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856 (citing Drieband v. Candler, 131
N.W. 129 (Mich. 1911)).
305. Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
306. See Young, 240 F.3d at 378.
307. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938); Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at
465; see also supra text accompanying notes 179-92 (discussing Lyeth); see gen-
erally discussion supra Part III.
308. See Young, 240 F.3d at 379. Accordingly, under North Carolina law, the
attorney does not have a property interest in the claim itself, but only in the in-
come resulting from the prosecution of the claim.
309. Id. at 378.
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that this did not prevent the amount of the fee from being
taxable to the assignor-wife, there is authority, as discussed
above, which has not applied the assignment of income doc-
trine where the claim was uncertain.31 ° In addition, Young
cited Coady as authority on this point,311 which in turn cited
Kochansky with approval, a case that did not involve a con-
tingent fee agreement in the context of the client-attorney re-
lationship, although it did involve the assignment of a claim
that was uncertain and speculative. 12
At the time of this writing, the most recent decision on
this issue is the Seventh Circuit case of Kenseth v. Commis-
sioner,"3 in which the contingency fee agreement was based
on an age discrimination claim. The Tax Court ruled that the
entire recovery was part of the client's gross income. On ap-
peal, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Wisconsin law to give a
security interest to an attorney in a contingency fee agree-
ment, but not make the attorney a joint owner of the claim it-
self."4 The court also noted that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court Rule of Professional Conduct prohibits lawyers in the
state from acquiring a proprietary interest in a client's cause
of action." 5 As previously indicated, the position of the court
in that regard may not be correct. The court's reliance on
Wisconsin law in Kenseth thereby emphasized the importance
of state law and distinguished the case from Cotnam and
Clarks, where state law provided the attorneys with an inde-
pendent interest in the amount recovered in litigation.
IX. THE RIPPLE EFFECT
If, in a given case, the assignment of income doctrine is
held to apply, the client will be required to report the entire
recovery as part of his gross income, and a deduction will be
allowed for the amount of the recovery distributed to the at-
torney as a fee under the contingency fee agreement."6 On
310. See Dodge v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 535 (D. Or. 1977); Jones v.
Comm'r, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962).
311. See Young, 240 F.3d at 378 (citing Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187,
1191 (9th Cir. 2000)).
312. See Kochansky v. Comm'r, 92 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1996). For a dis-
cussion of Kochansky, see supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
313. 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
314. See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883 (explaining WIS. STAT. § 757.36).
315. See id. (explaining Wis. Sup. CT. R. 20:1.8(j)).
316. See I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 212 (West 2001); see also discussion supra Part III.
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the surface, that sounds like appropriate treatment for the
client, but in reality it can be a major detriment. Of course, if
the client is in a position to deduct the legal fees as a business
expense, the fees will be subtracted directly from gross in-
come and will offset his prior inclusion of the amount of the
fees in gross income on a dollar-for-dollar basis.317 In that
case, there would be no difference between initially including
the entire amount of the recovery in the client's gross income
but allowing the client to deduct the legal fee, and taxing the
client only on the portion he received after the attorney's fee
is paid.
In most instances, it is doubtful that clients would be in a
position to deduct the legal fee as a business expense.318 They
will, however, most likely be able to deduct these expenses as
a miscellaneous itemized deduction, which means that it will
be subject to the two percent floor"9 and the Overall Limita-
tion on Itemized Deductions.32 ° Accordingly, taxpayers will
either receive only a limited deduction or may not qualify at
all to receive a deduction.3"' Recent tax legislation repealed
the Overall Limitation on Itemized Deductions provisions be-
ginning with the year 2006 and continuing through 2009; af-
ter 2009, these limitations will no longer apply.322 The two
percent floor provisions, however, will continue in effect.
The other problem relates to the alternative minimum
tax ("AMT").323 In computing that tax, no deduction is allowed
Under I.R.C. § 162, business deductions result in a dollar-for-dollar offset
against gross income, whereas under § 212, deductions for expenses incurred in
the production of income are reduced by the two percent floor on miscellaneous
itemized deductions (§ 67) and the overall limitation on itemized deductions (§
68).
317. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1), 162(a).
318. The deduction would be under I.R.C. § 212.
319. See I.R.C. § 67.
320. Id. § 68.
321. Taxpayers who cannot deduct legal fees under § 212, however, might be
able to capitalize them under § 263.
322. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
107-16, §§ 103, 901(a), 115 Stat. 44-45, 150.
323. "When it enacted the current version of the individual AMT in 1982,
Congress reemphasized that the overriding objective of the individual AMT was
that 'no taxpayer with substantial economic income should be able to avoid vir-
tually all tax liability by using exclusions, deductions, and credits.'" Davis, su-
pra note 208, at 1695 n.92 (quoting STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX
EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 17 (Comm. Print 1982)).
805
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
for miscellaneous itemized deductions."4 Accordingly, a tax-
payer subject to the AMT will not benefit at all from a deduc-
tion for the legal fees, which was the result for the taxpayer
in Benci-Woodward.325 In that case, the court rejected the
taxpayers' argument that the alternative minimum tax re-
sulted in inequities, stating that "such considerations ... are
more appropriately left for congressional resolution."26 The
harshness of the AMT was discussed in Alexander v. Internal
Revenue Service.27 The court noted, "We recognize that, be-
cause the amounts involved trigger the AMT... the outcome
smacks of injustice because Taxpayer is effectively robbed of
any benefit of the Legal Fee's below the line treatment," but,
nevertheless, rejected the taxpayer's argument that the loss
of a miscellaneous itemized deduction for the legal fees re-
sulted in inequality of treatment as compared to similarly
situated taxpayers. 8 In Kenseth, the Tax Court also noted
the limitations, which affect miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions, and the fact that such deductions are not available at
all for AMT purposes. In certain cases, attorneys' fees and
this tax burden, therefore, could erode the entire recovery of
damages awarded to the taxpayer in litigation.329
X. CONCLUSION
There is a clear conflict among the circuits on the issue of
the proper tax treatment of contingency fee arrangements.
The Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have ruled that where
the parties have entered into a contingency fee agreement,
the part of the recovery representing the attorney's fee is not
income to the client.3 ' The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth
and Federal Circuits have ruled that this amount is indeed
income to the client.3 ' The cases finding for the taxpayer-
client relied on state laws providing for attorneys liens, which
give the attorney a right equal to that of the client in the re-
covery. Alternatively, they refused to apply the assignment of
324. See I.R.C. § 56(b).
325. See Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000).
326. Id. at 943.
327. 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995).
328. Id. at 946.
329. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 406 (2000).
330. See cases cited supra note 19.
331. See cases cited supra note 20.
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income doctrine because the client's cause of action was
worthless, uncertain or indefinite at the time the client and
attorney executed the contingency fee agreement. Those
cases found that the services of the attorney were necessary
to bring value to the claim.8 2 The cases that have ruled in fa-
vor of the Government have invoked the assignment of in-
come doctrine and found that the client owned the entire
cause of action and thereby realized income by using the
property to retain an attorney who would apply his services
in the hope of producing income."' Some of these cases also
noted the importance of applicable state law in determining
the nature of the interests created by a contingency fee agree-
ment.334
This is a close question, one that gives rise to logical ar-
guments on both sides. In attempting to resolve this difficult
issue, we might note some overall characteristics of two of the
most important cases relating to assignments of income.
The Supreme Court first articulated the assignment of
income doctrine in Lucas v. Earl, which held that once the
taxpayer "earned" the fee as a result of personal services, the
fee was properly taxable to that individual. 335 . Lucas, how-
ever, did not involve an assignment of a part of a cause of ac-
tion, which is a form of property, nor did it involve a contin-
gent fee agreement. There was an agreement, however,
between the two parties to share future income and the court
held that the entire amount was includable in the husband's
gross income. It can be argued, therefore, that if the income
in Lucas was attributed solely to the party who earned it, it is
logical to conclude that the income resulting from the per-
sonal efforts of an attorney under a contingency fee arrange-
ment should be included in the gross income of only the at-
torney.
The contingency fee cases also differ from Horst, which
involved an attempt to assign only the income produced by
property still owned by the assignor. In that case, nothing
further remained to be done in order for the income to be re-
ceived. It therefore was attributable to the assignor who
owned the property that produced the income. On the other
332. See discussion supra Part VII.
333. See discussion supra Part VIII.
334. See discussion supra Part VIII.
335. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
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hand, in contingency fee cases, no income would be received
were it not for the personal efforts of the attorney.
Income produced through the services of an attorney can
be earned in one of two ways: the attorney can earn the in-
come as the agent or employee of the client, or he can earn it
as a joint venturer. A cause of action is a property right ca-
pable of being assigned to another, and under the law of sev-
eral states, the attorney can acquire an interest in the recov-
ery which is equal to that of the client."'
The assignment can be governed by state law, as in Cot-
nam and Clarks,337 or by the fact that the client has a claim
that is contingent and of no present value but requires the
services of an attorney to convert it into something of value.338
In the absence of state law giving the attorney a right equal
to that of the client, or in the absence of provisions in the con-
tingency fee agreement creating the same right in the attor-
ney, the entire recovery initially should be attributable to the
client. Also, if the facts indicate that an employment rela-
tionship is intended, the entire recovery should be treated as
income to the client, since the attorney would be operating as
an agent of the client.
But where state law or the terms of the contingency fee
agreement make it clear that the attorney, in effect, has an
interest in the claim equal to the client's, that part of the re-
covery representing his fee should be included in his gross in-
come only and not in the gross income of the client.339
The same result should follow where the facts show that
the client's claim was originally of no value and the services
of an attorney were required to create a valuable recovery."O
If, on the other hand, the facts indicate that the client's cause
of action had a definable value and the client entered into an
employment relationship with the attorney for the purpose of
recovering it, the entire recovery initially should be attribut-
able to the client in the absence of a state statute giving the
attorney the equivalent of an ownership interest in part of the
cause of action.
Accordingly, one cannot paint with too broad a brush in
336. See supra notes 200-52.
337. See discussion supra Part VII.A.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 96-104.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 93, 241.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 96-104.
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these cases. The provisions of state law, as well as the facts
and circumstances of each case, must be examined closely to
determine the true nature of the arrangement between the
client and the attorney and the proper tax effects thereof.
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The unfair result that follows in those jurisdictions ruling
that the income representing the attorneys' fee is taxable to
the client should be corrected by Congress. In the typical as-
signment of income case, such as Lucas and Horst, the income
in question is taxed only once, to the assignor.34' But in the
case of contingency fee agreements, the income in question of-
ten is included in the gross income of the client as well as the
attorney (as previously indicated, however, the client will or-
dinarily receive a deduction, which may not be fully benefi-
cial). Congress should enact legislation specifically providing
for income to result to the attorney only. Under the usual
contingent fee arrangement, the attorney is the taxpayer who
produces the income and is the one who should be taxed. If
the fee never is treated as income to the client, the problems
associated with the miscellaneous itemized deduction for le-
gal fees and the AMT would never be reached.
Although the primary issue with which we have been
concerned relates to the question of whether the assignment
of income doctrine applies to contingency fee agreements, this
issue has shed light on the unfair workings of the miscellane-
ous itemized deduction as well as the AMT. By repealing the
Overall Limitation on Itemized Deduction after 2009, Con-
gress has removed part of the cloud that has been concealing
what is really an increase in tax rates. 42 The conflict in the
circuits described in this article presents a clear opportunity
to correct some parts of our tax law that have produced un-
fairness as well as complexity.
Through the years, politicians and others have stressed
the need for "simplicity" in criticizing our tax code. As critics
have pointed out, many provisions involve complex calcula-
tions that have the indirect effect of raising tax rates. The
341. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940).
342. Congress has also repealed the personal exemption phase-out for years
after 2009. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Pub. L. 107-16, § 102, 115 Stat. 38, 44.
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various forms that are required for filing an individual tax re-
turn and the worksheets to make calculations add to the
complexity. Some have suggested drastic changes. In 2001,
Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama introduced S. 1040, the
"Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 2001," which was
directed at repealing the Internal Revenue Code and replac-
ing it with a flat tax rate for all taxpayers.343
Much could be done to make the present tax law easier to
understand. One measure that would simplify the Code
would be to abolish the two-tier system of deductions for indi-
viduals-deductions taken from gross income above the line
and deductions taken from adjusted gross income, below the
line. Individuals should be allowed to treat their deductions
as if they were corporations. All deductions should be taken
directly from gross income. Present itemized deductions,
such as medical expenses and charitable contributions, would
receive the same treatment as business deductions. The total
amount of those deductions, however, could be limited so that
there would be no loss of tax revenue. It is believed that this
system would provide a much simpler structure with which to
work, and the average taxpayer would find it more under-
standable.
The Section on Taxation of the ABA and the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation's proposal to abolish the alternative
minimum tax seems appropriate.345 The universal discontent
with the AMT and the unfair results that it can bring about
have been pointed out by many critics.346 A more straightfor-
343. S. 1040, 107th Cong. (2001). On March 15, 2001, Rep. Richard K. Ar-
mey introduced a similar bill, H.R. 1040. In addition, on June 26, 2001, Rep.
Philip M. Crane introduced H.R. 2313, which provided for the repeal of the in-
come taxation of corporations, imposition of a ten percent tax on earned income
of individuals, repeal of the estate and gift taxes and amnesty for all tax liabil-
ity for prior taxable years, and other changes. In addition, on August 2, 2001,
Rep. Steve Largent introduced H.R. 2714, which proposed, among other things,
setting a date for replacing the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with a simple
and fair alternative.
344. See supra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
345. For tax years 2001-2004, the exemption amount for the alternative
minimum tax has been increased by $4,000 for joint returns and $2,000 for in-
dividuals. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act § 701(a), 115
Stat. at 148 (amending I.R.C. § 55(d)(1)). That is only a token adjustment when
viewed in light of recommendation of the Section on Taxation of the A.B.A. See
Fresh Solutions, supra note 5.
346. See, e.g., American Institute of Certified Public Accountants et al., Joint
Tax Simplification Recommendations of the AICPA, American Bar Association
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ward means could easily be found to ensure that no revenue
is lost as a result of the repeal of the AMT. The revenue could
be protected by an application of special rates to preferential
types of income and special treatment for other preference
items. If the alternative minimum tax remains in effect,
which seems likely, a deduction from gross income could be
allowed for all legal fees in computing the tax. The conflict in
circuits over the taxation of contingency fee agreements pre-
sents an excellent opportunity for Congress to resolve that
question and simultaneously restructure parts of the Code so
as to make the application of the tax laws more fair and less
complex.
Section of Taxation, and Tax Executives Institute (Feb. 25, 2000), available at
http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/tax/taxpro/simpli.htm (recommending repeal
of the alternative minimum tax for individuals and corporations).

